
CalPERS Trust Level Review Risk Management Summary



Period Ending December 31, 2017

Investment Belief 9: Risk to CalPERS is multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility or tracking error. CalPERS shall develop a broad set of investment and actuarial risk measures and clear processes for managing risk. The path of returns matters, because highly volatile returns can have unexpected impacts on contribution rates and funding status.

	Total Fund Fore	ecast Volatilit	y Trends (%)	
		Current	Last Qtr	Last Year
	Policy Target	12/31/2017	9/30/2017	12/31/2016
Total	n/a	7.4	7.7	9.2
Benchmark	n/a	7.0	7.2	8.7
Tracking Error	< 1.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
Allocation	< 0.75	0.2	0.2	0.1
Selection	n/a	0.4	0.4	0.6



Comments:


Forecast Total Volatility of the PERF decreased by 179 bps over the last year. This change is primarily a reflection of historically low recent market volatility. Recent conditions carry higher weight in risk model calibration.

Rapid shifts in volatility regime can occur and would not be predicted by this model. The best interpretation of this estimate is as an indicator of the plan's volatility given the current market environment.

Asset Class	Market Value (\$millions)	Total Forecast Volatility (%)	% Contribution to Total Vol	Tracking Error (%)	ue at Risk* Smillions)	onditional * (\$millions)
PUBLIC EQUITY	\$ 176,440	10.8%	71.4%	0.2%	\$ 16,961	\$ 24,918
PRIVATE EQUITY	\$ 26,710	12.7%	11.6%	3.3%	\$ 2,574	\$ 3,991
INCOME	\$ 65,583	5.4%	1.7%	0.3%	\$ 3,725	\$ 5,208
REAL ASSETS	\$ 36,829	10.0%	10.7%	2.3%	\$ 3,640	\$ 5,172
INFLATION	\$ 27,422	7.4%	4.0%	0.3%	\$ 2,471	\$ 3,313
LIQUIDITY	\$ 14,660	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	\$ (278)	\$ (273)
TLPM	\$ 2,063	6.7%	0.5%	6.7%	\$ 93	\$ 150
OTHER PERF	\$ 278	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%	\$ 9	\$ 16
TOTAL FUND	\$ 349,986	7.4%	100.0%	0.6%	\$ 19,936	\$ 30,769

^{*1-}year, 95% confidence Value at Risk. Conditional Value at Risk measures the mean of the tail distribution beyond the 95% confidence level. Both are adjusted to account for 1 year of expected returns of each asset class and the PERF using June 2017 Capital Market Assumptions.


Source: BarraOne / CalPERS



The bottom chart plots the Forecast Total Volatility and Tracking Error for the Total Fund one year prior to each date vs. the Total Volatility and Tracking Error realized for that date. The graph highlights potential deviations between risk model estimates and subsequent realized volatility, due to the lagged and smoothed nature of risk models. In particular, modeled volatility forecasts tend to lag changes in regimes, for example the rapid increase in volatility during the period of the global financial crisis, and similarly the persistent decline in market volatility in the last few years.

Source: BarraOne, SSB, CalPERS

Liquidity Analysis: Total Plan



□1 Week □1 Month □1 Quarter □1 Year ■ Year +

Transactional liquidity is estimated for each asset class /strategy based on the current market environment while also accounting for legal structures or other factors that may impact liquidity. *Source: SSB, Calpers*

,,,	RF LIQUIDITY SNAPSHOT As of January 1, 2018				
	Expected Cash Flows for 1 Month				
1 1	Normal Conditions	Stress Scenario			
Cash Equivalents in Liquidity Portfolio (< 30 days)*	\$6,336,098,254	\$6,336,098,254			
Sources Total (cash flow in)	\$3,709,861,488	\$3,408,712,219			
Uses Total (cash flow out)	(\$2,090,496,332)	(\$2,090,496,332)			
Contingency Use**		(\$2,546,737,405)			
Expected Cash Equivalents (Period End)	\$7,955,463,411	\$5,107,576,737			
Liquidity Coverage Ratio	481%	210%			

= (a+b)/-(c+d)

Liquidity Coverage is computed from estimates of future cash inflows and outflows up to a 1 year horizon. In this table, the 1 month forward period is shown with Liquidity Coverage ratios for a normal environment and for a selected stress period (Global Financial Crisis). The Liquidity Coverage ratios could be interpreted as how many times (4.81 times in normal market conditions) available liquid cash /cash equivalents could cover projected cash needs over a 1 month forward period. *Source: BarraOne, SSB, CalPERS*

^{*} Excludes borrowed liquidity i.e. cash available in asset classes and cash collateral from sec lending

^{**} Contingency Use accounts for potential cash demands from derivatives positions, sec lending, and fund level contingent liabilities

COUNTERPARTY RISK



CDS spreads are regularly monitored for individual CalPERS counterparties. In addition, when aggregate spreads rise above 100 bps additional oversight measures are taken.

Counterparty	NET MTM FORWARDS (\$)	Net MTM OPTIONS (\$)	Net MTM SWAPS (\$)	CalPERS Exposure (\$)	Counter Party Exposure (\$)	Net MTM Total (\$)	Collateral Posted (\$)*	Net Credit Net Exposure (\$)
Bank of America	(18,227,443)	(54,636)	14,105,897	(18,530,179)	14,353,997	(4,176,182)	4,180,000	3,818
BNP Paribas	(8,830,000)		50,810,811	(11,992,364)	53,973,175	41,980,811	(42,025,000)	(44,189)
Barclays	(9,499,162)			(10,201,047)	701,885	(9,499,162)	9,500,000	838
Citigroup	(11,931,747)	(181,299)	14,192,872	(12,969,933)	15,049,759	2,079,826	(2,080,000)	(174)
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	(110,551)		13,430,910	(110,551)	13,430,910	13,320,359	(13,330,000)	(9,641)
Credit Suisse International			168,044		168,044	168,044	0	168,044
Deutsche Bank	(4,661,685)	(10,883)	391,336	(4,830,821)	549,589	(4,281,232)	4,290,000	8,768
Goldman Sachs Intl.	(45,023,604)	114,464,493	184,891,137	(157,171,820)	411,503,846	254,332,026	(254,350,000)	(17,974)
HSBC	9,208,979		315,319	(564,858)	10,089,156	9,524,298	(9,550,000)	(25,702)
JPMorgan Chase Bank	(5,100,734)	(35,341)	107,412,868	(22,915,459)	125,192,252	102,276,793	(102,280,000)	(3,207)
Morgan Stanley Capital Group			13,947,617		13,947,617	13,947,617	(13,950,000)	(2,383)
Morgan Stanley Capital Service	(9,266,916)	(64,876)	1,988,653	(12,426,442)	5,083,303	(7,343,139)	7,350,000	6,861
RBC Capital Markets	22,521				22,521	22,521	0	22,521
Standard Chartered Bank	(5,029)			(5,029)		(5,029)	0	(5,029)
Societe Generale	(774,402)	(1,079,700)	22,603,023	(8,286,787)	29,035,708	20,748,921	(20,750,000)	(1,079)
State Street	(102,319)			(110,854)	8,535	(102,319)	110,000	7,681
Toronto Dominion	(3,347,705)			(4,040,179)	692,474	(3,347,705)	3,350,000	2,295
UBS AGG	(663,397)			(990,382)	326,985	(663,397)	700,000	36,603
Wells Fargo			12,458,411		12,458,411	12,458,411	(12,460,000)	(1,589)
	(108,313,194)	113,037,758	436,716,898	(265,146,705)	706,588,167	441,441,462	(441,295,000)	146,462

^{*}As of 12/31 CalPERS posted 471mm to Counterparties which includes Internal and External Collateral

Above: Total market value exposure and net credit exposures are monitored for all of our OTC (over-the-counter) positions.

Source: Blackrock, CalPERS

Below: FCM (Futures Commission Merchant) exposures are monitored for how much margin we have posted with

our FCM. Source: CalPERS

FUTURES CLEARING MERCHANT EXPOSURE						
Futures Commission Merchant Collateral Posted						
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC	160,987,112					
MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED	53,662,371					

^{*}As of December 31, 2017

Total Fund Leverage Report

as of 12/31/17

Leverage changes a portfolio's risk profile through both impact on liquidity and amplification of returns volatility. As a metric, leverage has the benefit of being relatively straightforward to calculate, making it a good backstop to more nuanced but complex perspectives on risk that could suffer from model errors or flawed assumptions. However, since the leverage metric implicitly treats all assets as equally risky, and because it does not capture the interrelationships between assets (diversification), leverage should always be viewed in conjunction with other perspectives. For example, a low leverage portfolio could easily be more risky than a better-diversified moderate leverage portfolio.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage:

"L1" captures exposures with full recourse to the total plan, and is most relevant from an immediate liquidity perspective. "L2" includes non-recourse borrowing, which can amplify risk and returns for a given \$ invested.

Company Embedded Leverage:

Some Fund assets embed leverage by their nature (i.e., private and public companies). In this case, leverage is not a result of a portfolio management decision, but does contribute to the assets' inherent riskiness.

Unfunded Commitments:

Represent potential draws on Fund liquidity, but are contingent in nature.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage

		L1: Portfolio	Leverage -	Full Re	course		i	L2: Portfolio	Leverage w/No	n-Recourse
Asset Class/ Program	Net Market Value (\$Billions) (A)	+ Source	s of Levera	ge ¹	- Cash²	Gross Market Exposure (B)	Portfolio Leverage (B/A)	Additional + Sources of Leverage	Gross Market Exposure (C)	Portfolio Leverage (C/A)
		Derivatives	Recourse Debt	Other				Non Recourse Debt		
Public Equity	176.4	8.1			1.8	182.8	1.04	ĺ	182.8	1.04
Private Equity	26.7		1.6 ³		0.0	28.3	1.06	i	28.3	1.06
Income	65.6	4.7			2.1	68.2	1.04	į	68.2	1.04
Liquidity	14.7				14.7	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.00
Real Assets	36.8		0.0^{4}		0.6	36.2	0.98	17.6	53.8	1.46 ⁵
Inflation	27.4	7.1			6.3	28.2	1.03	į	28.2	1.03
Securities Lending ⁶	0.0			5.8	5.8	0.0	N/M	j	0.0	N/M
Credit Enhancement	0.0			0.1		0.1	N/M	į	0.1	N/M
Other Trust Level ⁷	2.3			0.5	1.5	1.3	0.55		1.3	N/M
Total Fund	\$350.0	\$19.9	\$1.6	\$6.4	32.8	\$345.1	0.99	\$17.6	\$362.6	1.04

Embedded Leverage in Asset Classes

	Implied Leverage ⁸
Public Equity	1.53
Private Equity	2.22
Real Estate	1.27


Unfunded Commitments


	Net Market Value (\$B)	Unfunded Commitments (\$B) ⁹	% of Total Fund
Private Equity	26.7	14.2	4.1%
Real Assets	36.8	9.2	2.6%

- 1. FX Forwards used for hedging and fixed income duration shifting are not counted as leverage. Options are included based on delta adjusted notional value.
- 2. Cash is defined as assets meeting Liquidity program guidelines, and include cash holdings in the Fund.
- 3. Subscription financing and other liabilities at the fund level (as of Jun 30, 2017) are shown as recourse, while defined non-recourse for policy definition.
- 4. Recourse Debt in Real Estate is about \$4.5m and it has not changed from the prior quarter.
- 5. Policy leverage for Real Assets is measured as a Loan-to-Value ratio and will differ from figure shown in table. LTV leverage as of 9/30/17 for Real Estate, Infrastructure and Forestland are: 31%, 43%, and 22%, respectively.
- 6. Securities lending includes only securities lent for cash collateral (which creates a source of financing).
- 7. Other Trust Level includes: Absolute Return Strategies and other Plan Level Portfolios.
- 8. Implied leverage is estimated from either asset class benchmark data or industry research. It represents the Enterprise Value to Equity ratio.
- 9. Unfunded commitments are as of 12/31/17 for Private Equity and 9/30/17 for Real Assets. 96% of Real Asset unfunded commitments are revocable at CalPERS' discretion.


Source: BarraOne, SSB, Factset, CalPERS

CONCENTRATION REPORT






Source: BarraOne, CalPERS



Country	PERF Weight (%)	Policy Bmk Weight (%)	Active Weight (%)
United States	64.5%	69.1%	-4.6%
Japan	5.0%	5.0%	-0.1%
United Kingdom	4.6%	4.4%	0.2%
France	2.5%	2.2%	0.3%
Canada	2.2%	2.1%	0.1%
Germany	1.9%	2.0%	-0.2%
Australia	1.7%	1.4%	0.2%
China	1.5%	1.3%	0.2%
Switzerland	1.3%	1.5%	-0.2%
Italy	1.0%	0.8%	0.2%



Source: BarraOne, CalPERS

STRESS TESTING

Historical scenarios highlight the sensitivity of the portfolio to past economic regimes or specific events. The scenarios can be used as a "what if" gauge of current portfolio positioning to understand the potential impact if a similar event or regime were to repeat.

Scenario	P	ortfolio Return	Policy Benchmark Return	Excess Return	
1973 - 1974 Oil Crisis (Oct 1973 - Mar 1974)		-3.6%	-3.3%	-0.3%	
2016 Brexit (Jun 2016)		-3.7%	-3.5%	-0.2%	
2010 Peripheral European Bond Crisis (Mar 2010 - May 2010)		-5.7%	-5.4%	-0.3%	
2001 Sept 11 (Sep 2001)		-7.6%	-7.0%	-0.6%	
1998 Russian Financial Crisis (Jul 1998 - Oct 1998)		-8.2%	-7.2%	-1.1%	
2011 US Debt Ceiling Act (May 2011 - Sep 2011)		-9.2%	-8.4%	-0.8%	
1987 Market Crash (Aug 1987 to Nov 1987)		-9.4%	-8.6%	-0.7%	
2007-2008 Equity Slow Grind (Sep 2007 - Aug 2008)		-9.8%	-8.8%	-1.0%	
2000-2003 Tech Crash & Recession (Jan 2000 - Mar 2003)		-15.7%	-13.0%	-2.8%	
2008 - 2009 Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008 - Mar 2009)		-30.3%	-28.3%	-2.0%	



Source: BarraOne, CalPERS

1. How to interpret the OTC Counterparty Risk Exposure section

	OT	C Deriv	ative Co	unterpa	rty Expos	sure Rep	ort	
Counterparty	NET MTM FORWARDS (\$)	Net MTM OPTIONS (\$)	Net MTM SWAPS (\$)	CalPERS Exposure (\$)	Counter Party Exposure (\$)	Net MTM Total (\$)	Collateral Posted	Net Credit Net Exposure (\$)
Counterparty 123	10,386,714.00	(84,745.00)	11,735,283.00	27,147,091.00	(25,475,215.00)	1,671,876.00	(1,525,000.00)	146,876.00
NET MTM BY PRODUCT TYPI Columns reflect the net mark to m. (MTM) of all OTC trades by produc with a Counterparty + amount = CalPERS has a gain on the positions - amount = CalPERS has a loss on the positions	arket ttype the						ref cre Con wit pri • + a	NET CREDIT EXPOSU e net credit exposure lects the open uncoll dit exposure risk if a unterparty were to de th no change in mark to ces mounts reflect open ere CalPERS is owed in
			the total across all Counterp • + amoun	NET MTM TOT market to market of current net profit I open OTC trades party it = CalPERS is owe t = CalPERS owes r	column reflects or loss position with a d money	The collatera dollar amoun posted to Cal posted to a C + amount = C	LLATERAL POSTED I posted column refi It of collateral that is PERS or that CalPER: ounterparty to offse alPERS has posted n ounterparty has pos	either Shas et credit risk noney out

^{*}Net mark to market (MTM): positions are adjusted to reflect current market values and then summed