
CalPERS Trust Level Review Risk Management Summary



Period Ending May 31, 2017

Investment Belief 9: Risk to CaIPERS is multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility or tracking error. CaIPERS shall develop a broad set of investment and actuarial risk measures and clear processes for managing risk. The path of returns matters, because highly volatile returns can have unexpected impacts on contribution rates and funding status.

Total Fund Forecast Volatility Trends (%)							
		Current	Last Qtr	Last Year			
	Policy Limit	5/31/2017	3/31/2017	5/31/2016			
Total	n/a	8.3	8.6	10.4			
Benchmark	n/a	7.9	8.2	10.2			
Tracking Error	< 1.5%	0.5	0.6	0.8			
Allocation	< .75%	0.1	0.1	0.0			
Selection	n/a	0.5	0.5	0.7			




Comments:

Forecast Total Volatility of the PERF decreased by 213 bps over the last year. Approximately 75% of the decrease is due to recent low market volatility and about 25% of the decrease is due to positioning changes.


Asset Class	arket Value Smillions)	Total Forecast Volatility (%)	% Contribution to Total Vol	Tracking Error (%)	Value at Risk* (\$millions) Conditional VaR* (\$millions)		VaR*
PUBLIC EQUITY	\$ 155,093	12.3%	69.1%	0.2%	\$ 19,254	\$	27,204
PRIVATE EQUITY	\$ 26,180	14.8%	12.7%	3.7%	\$ 3,194	\$	4,811
INCOME	\$ 59,613	6.0%	1.9%	0.3%	\$ 3,846	\$	5,340
REAL ASSETS	\$ 35,815	11.2%	11.7%	2.5%	\$ 4,222	\$	5,921
LIQUIDITY	\$ 15,111	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	\$ (159)	\$	(155)
INFLATION	\$ 25,571	7.8%	4.1%	0.8%	\$ 2,518	\$	3,354
ARS	\$ 288	5.9%	0.0%	5.9%	\$ 9	\$	17
MAC	\$ 1,278	9.0%	0.4%	9.0%	\$ 108	\$	156
TOTAL FUND	\$ 322,202	8.3%	100.0%	0.5%	\$ 23,143	\$	34,306

*1-year, 95% confidence Value at Risk. Conditional Value at Risk measures the mean of the tail distribution beyond the 95% confidence level. Both are adjusted to account for 1 year of expected returns of each asset class and the PERF using Wilshire June 2016 expected return assumptions.

Due to reporting constraints, all risk statistics are as of May 31, 2017 unless otherwise stated.



The bottom chart plots the Forecast Total Volatility and Tracking Error for the Total Fund one year prior to each date vs. the Total Volatility and Tracking Error realized for that date. The graph shows the lagged nature of long term risk models that incorporate a larger backward estimation window which you can see from the realized volatility leading the forecast from the model and highlights the importance of looking at changes in realized volatility that may indicate a deviation from capital markets assumptions.



Liquidity Analysis: Total Plan

□1 Week □1 Month □1 Quarter □1 Year ■ Year +


Transactional liquidity is estimated for each asset class /strategy based on the current market environment while also accounting for legal structures or other factors that may impact liquidity. Source: SSB, CalPERS

	ERF LIQUIDITY SNAPSHOT As of July 1, 2017						
	Expected Cash FI	Expected Cash Flows for 1 Month					
	Normal Conditions	Stress Scenario					
Cash Equivalents in Liquidity Portfolio (< 30 days)*	\$9,294,625,244	\$9,285,116,332					
Sources Total (cash flow in)	\$3,290,124,224	\$2,774,541,764					
Uses Total (cash flow out)	(\$2,649,106,298)	(\$2,649,106,298)					
Contingency Use**		(\$3,286,417,553)					
Expected Cash Equivalents (Period End)	\$9,935,643,170	\$6,124,134,245	7				
Liquidity Coverage Ratio	475%	203%	= (a+b)/				

C+d)

** Contingency Use accounts for potential cash demands from derivatives positions, sec lending, and fund level contingent liabilities

Liquidity Coverage is computed from estimates of future cash inflows and outflows up to a 1 year horizon. In this table, the 1 month forward period is shown with Liquidity Coverage ratios for a normal environment and for a selected stress period (Sept 2008). The Liquidity Coverage ratios could be interpreted as how many times (4.75 times in normal market conditions) available liquid cash /cash equivalents could cover projected cash needs over a 1 month forward period. Source: BarraOne, SSB, CalPERS



CDS spreads are regularly monitored for individual CaIPERS counterparties. In addition, when aggregate spreads rise above 100 bps additional oversight measures are taken.

Counterparty	<u>Net MTM</u> FORWARDS (\$)	<u>Net MTM</u> OPTIONS (\$)	<u>Net MTM</u> <u>SWAPS</u> (<u>\$</u>)	<u>CaIPERS</u> Exposure (\$)	Counter Party Exposure (\$)	<u>Net MTM Total</u> <u>(\$)</u>	Collateral Posted (\$)*	<u>Net Credit Net</u> <u>Exposure</u> (\$)
Australia and New Zealand Banking	226,922				226,922	226,922	(230,000)	(3,078)
Bank of Montreal	(1,866,504)			(1,866,528)	24	(1,866,504)	1,900,000	33,496
Bank of America	(18,181,349)	(190,206)	17,127,052	(22,134,587)	20,890,084	(1,244,503)	1,250,000	5,497
BNP Paribas	1,302,097		13,124,848	(5,812,780)	20,239,725	14,426,945	(14,450,000)	(23,055)
Barclays	(1,018,597)			(1,957,199)	938,602	(1,018,597)	1,100,000	81,403
Citigroup	(4,088,477)		438,618	(5,852,674)	2,202,815	(3,649,859)	3,650,000	141
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	(2,254)		2,069,340	(2,254)	2,069,340	2,067,086	(2,070,000)	(2,914)
Credit Suisse International	(56,323)		(12,698)	(100,617)	31,596	(69,021)	0	(69,021)
Deutsche Bank	(5,270,802)			(7,967,737)	2,696,935	(5,270,802)	5,280,000	9,198
Goldman Sachs Intl.	311,469	1,521,373	29,066,996	(105,707,385)	136,607,223	30,899,838	(30,900,000)	(162)
HSBC	(2,362,093)		(5,426)	(21,418,244)	19,050,725	(2,367,519)	2,400,000	32,481
JPMorgan Chase Bank	(23,529,685)	(10,450,600)	15,697,912	(41,158,360)	22,875,987	(18,282,373)	18,290,000	7,627
Morgan Stanley Capital Group			2,169,798		2,169,798	2,169,798	(2,200,000)	(30, 202)
Morgan Stanley Capital Service	74,636	(796,572)	(565,278)	(12,741,634)	11,454,420	(1,287,214)	1,300,000	12,786
RBC Capital Markets	(1,272,959)			(1,272,959)		(1,272,959)	1,280,000	7,041
Standard Chartered Bank	(10,994,026)			(11,111,852)	117,826	(10,994,026)	11,000,000	5,974
Societe Generale	(21,590,125)	271,531	3,347,812	(30,070,375)	12,099,593	(17,970,782)	17,980,000	9,218
State Street	468,841			(142,129)	610,970	468,841	(440,000)	28,841
Toronto Dominion	(18,133,456)			(18,683,436)	549,980	(18,133,456)	18,140,000	6,544
UBS AGG	(8,021,006)	111		(8,835,616)	814,721	(8,020,895)	8,050,000	29,105
Wells Fargo			11,140,251		11,140,251	11,140,251	(11,150,000)	(9,749)
Grand Total	(114,003,691)	(9,644,363)	93,599,225	(296,836,366)	266,787,537	(30,048,829)	30,180,000	131,171

*As of 6/30 Counterparties posted 61mm to Counterparties which includes Internal and External Collateral

Above: Total market value exposure and net credit exposures are monitored for all of our OTC (over-the-counter) positions. The green check box in the OTC exposure table indicates that the total market value exposure is within our procedural tolerances.

Source: Blackrock, CalPERS

Below: FCM (Futures Commission Merchant) exposures are monitored for how much initial margin we have posted with our FCM in addition to reviewing key metrics that provide some insight on the FCM's risk profile such as Excess Net Capital (amount of additional capital the FCM has to support the business) and customer assets. Large changes in these metrics could be an indicator of potential credit or operational issues with the FCM and would trigger an internal review. *Source: CalPERS, CFTC*

FUTURES CLEARING MERCHANT EXPOSURE							
Futures Commission Merchant	Collateral Posted	Procedure	Excess	Procedure	Customers'	Procedure	
Futures Commission Merchant	Collateral Posted	Check	Net Capital	Check	Assets	Check	
CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC	269,673,620	0	8,087,250,523	0	8,282,621,651	0	
MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED	80,136,723	0	10,759,033,596	0	14,256,144,706	0	
*As of May 31, 2017							

LEVERAGE

Total Fund Leverage Report

as of 06/30/17

Leverage changes a portfolio's risk profile through both impact on liquidity and amplification of returns volatility. As a metric, leverage has the benefit of being relatively straightforward to calculate, making it a good backstop to more nuanced but complex perspectives on risk that could suffer from model errors or flawed assumptions. However, since the leverage metric implicitly treats all assets as equally risky, and because it does not capture the interrelationships between assets (diversification), leverage should always be viewed in conjunction with other perspectives. For example, a low leverage portfolio could easily be more risky than a better-diversified moderate leverage portfolio.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage:

"L1" captures exposures with full recourse to the total plan, and is most relevant from an immediate liquidity perspective. "L2" includes non-recourse borrowing, which can amplify risk and returns for a given \$ invested.

Company Embedded Leverage:

Some Fund assets embed leverage by their nature (i.e., private and public companies). In this case, leverage is not a result of a portfolio management decision, but does contribute to the assets' inherent riskiness.

Unfunded Commitments:

Represent potential draws on Fund liquidity, but are contingent in nature.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage

		L1: Portfolio	Leverage ·	Full Red	ourse			L2: Portfolio	Leverage w/No	n-Recourse
Asset Class/ Program	Net Market Value (\$Billions) (A)	+ Source	s of Levera	ge ¹	Cash ²	Gross Risk Exposure (B)	Portfolio Leverage (B/A)	Additional + Sources of Leverage ¹	Gross Risk Exposure (C)	Portfolio Leverage (C/A)
		Derivatives	Recourse Debt ³	Other				Non Recourse Debt		İ
Public Equity	156.2	11.3			6.7	160.7	1.03	ļ	160.7	1.03
Private Equity	25.9				0.0	25.9	1.00	1.7	27.6	1.07
Income	62.9	6.5			4.5	64.8	1.03	ļ	64.8	1.03
Liquidity	15.5				15.5	0.0	0.00		0.0	0.00
Real Assets	36.3		0.005		0.0	36.3	1.00	17.6	53.9	1.49 ⁴
Inflation	25.3	7.3			6.5	26.1	1.03		26.1	1.03
Securities Lending ⁵	0.0			4.4	4.4	0.0	N/M		0.0	N/M
Credit Enhancement	0.0			0.3		0.3	N/M		0.3	N/M
Other Trust Level ⁶	1.6					1.6	1.00		1.6	N/M
Total Fund	\$323.5	\$25.1	\$0.0	\$4.7	\$37.6	\$315.7	0.98	\$19.3	\$335.0	1.04

Company	Empedded Leverage	
	Net Market	Estima

	Value (\$B)	Enterprise Value (\$B)	Implied Leverage
Public Equity ⁷	156.2	213.9	1.37
Private Equity ⁸	25.9	43.7	1.69

Unfunded Commitments						
	Net Market Value (\$B)	Unfunded Commitments (\$B) ⁹	% of Total Fund			
Private Equity	25.9	14.2	4.4%			
Real Assets	36.3	9.1	2.8%			

1. FX Forwards used for hedging and fixed income duration shifting are not counted as leverage. Options are included based on delta adjusted notional value.

2. Cash is defined as assets meeting Liquidity program guidelines, and include cash holdings in the Fund except frictional balances with external managers.

3. Recourse Debt in Real Estate has not changed from the prior period.

4. Policy leverage for Real Assets is measured as a Loan-to-Value ratio and will differ from figure shown in table. LTV leverage as of 3/31/17 for Real Estate, Infrastructure and Forestland are: 31%, 46%, and 22%, respectively.

5. Securities lending includes only securities lent for cash collateral (which creates a source of financing).


6. Other Trust Level includes: Absolute Return Strategies, Multi-Asset Class Composite, Transition, and Plan Level Portfolios.


7. Embedded leverage for Public Equity is estimated using the Enteprise Value/Capital ratio for Public Equity. Source: Factset.

8. Embedded leverage for Private Equity represents debt exposure at the portfolio company level, and is estimated using the Enteprise Value/Equity ratio as of 12/31/15. Source: Private Equity program.


9. Unfunded commitments are as of 12/31/16.


CONCENTRATION REPORT





Source: BarraOne, CalPERS





HISTORICAL SCENARIOS


Historical scenarios highlight the sensitivity of the portfolio to past economic regimes or specific events. The scenarios can be used as a "what if" gauge of current portfolio positioning to understand the potential impact if a similar event or regime were to repeat.

Best and Worst Scenarios - Excess Return

Scenario	Portfolio Return	Policy Benchmark Return	Excess Return
1994 US Rate Hike	-3.1%	-3.6%	0.4%
1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis	-0.5%	-0.9%	0.4%
1995 US Dollar Rally	1.6%	1.2%	0.4%
2008 - 2009 Global Financial Crisis	-28.9%	-27.7%	-1.1%
2008 Lehman Bust	-26.3%	-25.1%	-1.2%
2007-2009 Subprime and Credit Crisis	-34.4%	-33.0%	-1.4%


Best and Worst Scenarios - Portfolio Return

Scenario	Portfolio Return	Policy Benchmark Return	Excess Return
2001 Fed Rate Cut	4.2%	3.8%	0.4%
1995 US Dollar Rally	1.6%	1.2%	0.4%
2003 Iraq War	1.5%	1.2%	0.3%
2008 Lehman Bust	-26.3%	-25.1%	-1.2%
2008 - 2009 Global Financial Crisis	-28.9%	-27.7%	-1.1%
2007-2009 Subprime and Credit Crisis	-34.4%	-33.0%	-1.4%



Source: BarraOne, CalPERS

1. How to interpret the OTC Counterparty Risk Exposure section



*Net mark to market (MTM): positions are adjusted to reflect current market values and then summed