MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OPEN SESSION

ROBERT F. CARLSON AUDITORIUM

LINCOLN PLAZA NORTH

400 P STREET

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2019 9:02 A.M.

JAMES F. PETERS, CSR CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER LICENSE NUMBER 10063

APPEARANCES

BOARD MEMBERS:

- Mr. Henry Jones, President
- Ms. Theresa Taylor, Vice President
- Ms. Margaret Brown
- Mr. Rob Feckner
- Ms. Dana Hollinger
- Ms. Adria Jenkins-Jones
- Ms. Fiona Ma, represented by Mr. Frank Ruffino
- Mr. David Miller
- Ms. Mona Pasquil Rogers
- Mr. Ramon Rubalcava
- Mr. Bill Slaton
- Ms. Betty Yee, represented by Ms. Lynn Paquin

STAFF:

- Ms. Marcie Frost, Chief Executive Officer
- Mr. Matt Jacobs, General Counsel
- Ms. Cara Buchanan, Board Secretary
- Ms. Marguerite Seabourn, Assistant Chief Counsel
- Mr. John Shipley, Senior Attorney

ALSO PRESENT:

- Mr. Stephen Silver, Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver
- Mr. Vance Piggott, Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver

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1. Call to Order and Roll Call	1
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3. Full Board Hearing - Henry Jones a. Mark L. Wheeler, Thomas R. Valdez, John M. Lopez, Larry D. Blackwell & Garry G. Cohoe (consolidated) Closed Session - Deliberate on Full Board Hearing (Government Code section 11126(c)(3)) b. Mark L. Wheeler, Thomas R. Valdez, John M. Lopez, Larry D. Blackwell & Garry G. Cohoe (consolidated) Open Session - Take Action on Full Board Hearing c. Mark L. Wheeler, Thomas R. Valdez, John M. Lopez, Larry D. Blackwell & Garry G. Cohoe (consolidated)	2 64 64
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PROCEEDINGS 1 PRESIDENT JONES: I would like to call the Board 2 3 of Administration meeting to order. The first order of business is roll call, please. 4 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Good morning. 5 PRESIDENT JONES: Good morning. 6 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: 7 Henry Jones? 8 PRESIDENT JONES: Here. 9 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Theresa Taylor? VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Here. 10 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Margaret Brown? 11 BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Good morning. 12 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Rob Feckner? 1.3 BOARD MEMBER FECKNER: Good morning. 14 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: 15 Dana Hollinger? 16 BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Good morning. BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Adria Jenkins-Jones? 17 Frank Ruffino for Fiona Ma? 18 ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Present. 19 20 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: David Miller? BOARD MEMBER MILLER: Here. 21 BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Jason Perez? 22 23 PRESIDENT JONES: Excused.

BOARD MEMBER PASQUIL ROGERS:

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BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Mona Pasquil Rogers?

Here.

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BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Ramon Rubalcava?
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             BOARD MEMBER RUBALCAVA: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Bill Slaton?
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             BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Here.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: And Lynn Paquin for
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   Betty Yee?
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             ACTING BOARD MEMBER PAQUIN:
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Thank you.
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             Then we have -- need approval of the Board of
   Administration timed agenda. So we have a motion on that.
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             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Move approval.
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             BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Second.
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Moved by Ms. Taylor, second by
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   Ms. Hollinger.
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             All in favor say aye?
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             (Ayes.)
             PRESIDENT JONES: Opposed?
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             Hearing none. The item passes.
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             The next item on the agenda is the full Board
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    Hearing.
             So good morning. We now turn to Agenda Item 3
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    and open the record for the full Board hearing in the
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    consolidated appeals of members Mark L. Wheeler, Thomas R.
    Valdez, John M. Lopez, Larry Blackwell, and Garry Cohoe,
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    CalPERS case numbers 2017-1073, 2017-0275, 2017-0686,
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2017-0966, and 2017-1217.
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             Let us first take a roll call, please. Yeah, to
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   be sure that it's consistent with the hearing.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Okay.
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             Henry Jones?
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN:
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                                         Theresa Taylor?
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             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Here.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Margaret Brown?
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             BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Rob Feckner?
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             BOARD MEMBER FECKNER: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Dana Hollinger?
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             BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Adria Jenkins-Jones?
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             BOARD MEMBER JENKINS-JONES: Here.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Frank Ruffino for
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   Fiona Ma?
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             ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: David Miller?
             BOARD MEMBER MILLER: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Jason Perez?
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23
             PRESIDENT JONES: Excused.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Mona Pasquil Rogers?
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             BOARD MEMBER PASQUIL ROGERS: Here.
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BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Ramon Rubalcava?

BOARD MEMBER RUBALCAVA: Here.

BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Bill Slaton?

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Here.

BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: And Lynn Paquin for

Betty Yee?

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ACTING BOARD MEMBER PAQUIN: Here.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Thank you.

The proposed decision in this case was originally considered by the Board at the November 2018 Board meeting. At that meeting, the Board rejected the proposed decision and scheduled this matter for a full Board hearing on the question of how the member's compensation earnable should be calculated under the PERL, in light of the reciprocity agreements in place between PERS and the applicable county retirement system.

I note for the record that all parties have received notice of this full Board hearing, along with copies of the Statement of Policy and Procedures for Full Board Hearing before the Board.

In addition, all parties have been informed in writing that oral argument will be limited to 10 minutes for each position, and rebuttal will be limited to 3 minutes for each position.

Would counsel please take a moment to introduce

themselves, starting with staff counsel and then the members' counsel.

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: John Shipley on behalf of Calpers.

ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL SEABOURN: Marguerite Seabourn on behalf of Calpers.

MR. SILVER: Stephen Silver and Vance Piggott on behalf of the five respondents.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Thank you.

Let the record also reflect that Chirag Shah, the Board's independent counsel on full Board hearings and proposed decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings will be advising the Board on procedural and substantive issues, and answering questions that Board members may have today. Mr. Shah will also provide a brief summary of the case before we begin our oral argument.

As stated previously, each position will be 10 minutes for oral arguments. Mr. Shipley will -- will first have 10 minutes to present staff's argument. After that, Mr. Silver will have 10 minutes to present arguments on behalf of the five members. Neither side is compelled to use the full 10 minutes. However, if a party concludes argument is less than the time allotted, it will not be permitted to carry that time to any other position on

this -- for this proceeding.

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After both sides have presented oral arguments, each side will be provided three minutes for rebuttal arguments in the same order as the original presentation. First, Mr. Shipley for staff, then Mr. Silver for members. Here, too, you may, but do not have to, use the entire time allocated for rebuttal. But if you decide to use less time, you will not have another opportunity to use any time remaining in your rebuttal.

There is a timer in front of you, which will be set for 10 minutes for initial argument and three minutes for rebuttals. The timer will begin when you start to speak. Please pay close attention to the timer as you may -- as you make your presentation in order to avoid going over your allocated time. When the timer lights turn red, your time will have expired.

After all sides' arguments and rebuttals are concluded, the Board may ask questions of any of the parties to this proceeding, as well as our independent counsel.

The alternatives available to the Board are set forth at Agenda Item 3 for the full -- for the Board meeting material.

Any questions so far?

25 Staff?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: No, Mr. President.

MR. SILVER: No questions.

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PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Now, then Mr. Chirag -- Mr. Shah, please provide a brief summary of the case.

MR. SHAH: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. President and members of the Board. As you said, my name is Chirag Shah. And I am the Board's independent counsel on full Board hearings.

Given the nature of this case, my brief summary this morning will be briefer than usual. I will let each counsel educate the Board on the details and the merits of there respective positions. This consolidated hearing involves five separate but substantially similar disputes over the definition of compensation and compensation earnable, primarily under sections 20630, 20636, and 20638 of the Public Employees's Retirement Law or more -- or what is more commonly known as the PERL, and their counterparts in County Employees' Retirement Law of 1937.

The material facts of the case are not in dispute, and have been stipulated to by all parties to this proceeding, which can be found at Exhibit I of Agenda Item 3. The disputes before the Board are largely legal in nature, in as much as they require interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, as opposed to a fact-specific dispute.

The members in this appeal all have earned service credit with a reciprocal employer, who at all relevant times to this matter participated in the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, or the San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association. Both system, as most people here know, are county-based pension systems governed by the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937.

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The specific question before the Board is whether in Calculating members' pensions under the PERL, Calpers staff must apply the definition of compensation quote unquote as found in the PERL or the County Employees Retirement Law.

A related issue is whether even if the PERL were to be applied, certain additional items of compensation received by only three of the members involved in this appeal satisfy the requirements of PERL and it's implement -- implementing regulations. These items were classified by the relevant employers as longevity/merit bonus pay, and top of range merit pay.

In the proposed decision, the administrative law judge finds that in calculating members' pension calculations under the PERL, CalPERS staff must accept final compensation as reported by the county-based systems applying the definition of compensation and compensation

earnable and related definitions as found in the County Employees Retirement Law.

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Given this finding, the ALJ deems it unnecessary to make a legal determination regarding the additional items of compensation, namely the longevity merit bonus pay and the top of range merit may. However, those items are still in dispute and therefore require Board -- a determination by the Board and will be argued by the parties before you today.

The members argue that the Administrative Law Judge has reached a correct legal determination, and therefore the Board should adopt the proposed decision in its entirety and thereby grant the appeals. Staff, on the other hand, argues that the Board should deny the appeals and issue its own decision, finding that CalPERS is compelled to apply only PERL definition in the calculation of PERL benefits.

The details of the case, the history of the litigation, and the merits of each party's position are presented in the written arguments and the administrative record before the Board at Agenda Item 3.

With that, Mr. President and members of the Board, I conclude my very brief summary of the case this morning.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Let us now turn to

preliminary evidentiary issues. As all parties are aware, we are not here to relitigate factual issues or resubmit evidence into the administrative record. However, in rare circumstances, in the interests of achieving a just result, may require consideration of newly discovered relevant documentary evidence, which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the hearing before the administrative law judge, and which therefore is not part of the administrative record.

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Under no circumstance may the Board accept new witness's testimony or any kind of examination or cross-examination of anyone, including Board members in today's proceedings.

Under the Board' procedures -- excuse me -requests to introduce newly discovered documentary
evidence must have been submitted in writing to the
Board's secretary no later than the due date for the
written argument, which, in this case, was February 6th,
2019.

In order to avoid interruptions during each party's respective time today, please let us know now if either party has any revelant -- relevant newly discovered evidence, which could not have been discovered and produced at their hearing that it seeks to be admitted into the administrative record today as to which a timely

written request was submitted to the Board.

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: No, Mr. President.

MR. SILVER: We don't have any either.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Thank you.

Seeing there's no requests to submit newly discovered evidence, let us begin oral arguments.

Mr. Shipley, please present staff's argument. Please start the clock for 10 minutes when Mr. Shipley begins argument.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Good morning, Mr. President and Board members.

The issue before this Board is not new or unique. The issue is whether this Board determines the benefits CalPERS provides its members. This Board has repeatedly rejected the view that other agencies or retirement systems dictate what benefits CalPERS must pay. And for good reason, the Legislature vested in this Board the sole authority to determine what benefits CalPERS' members are entitled to receive under the PERL.

The respondents in these cases retired as reciprocal members, meaning they were members of two public retirement systems and received two retirement checks, one from CalPERS, and one from a county retirement system. The size of the checks is determined by the amount of pensionable income they -- the member received.

This Board, in appeals identical to the one before it today, has repeatedly found that CalPERS must utilize the definition of pensionable income contained in the PERL. If CalPERS is required to use pensionable income amount reported by the reciprocal system, CalPERS would have no control over the amount of benefits it pays reciprocal members. The county system would dictate to this Board how it administers CalPERS -- how it administers the system. That would defy common sense and it would -- as well as the law.

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This Board, based on the record before it, has the authority to consider and rule on all issues addressed in the administrative appeal. The record shows that CalPERS properly rejected items of pay the respondents received that did not comply with the PERL's definition of pensionable income. For this reason, respondents' appeal should be denied.

Respondents initially established membership with CalPERS and subsequently went to work under a county retirement system. How this moved from CalPERS to a county system impacts the members' CalPERS retirement benefits is best illustrated through an example.

Imagine you have two individuals who have identical careers. For 30 years they have the same jobs, salaries, and benefits. They both work for the State for

10 years, and then transfer to a new job at a local agency. The only difference is person A transferred to a local agency that contracts with CalPERS for retirement benefits, and person B transferred to a county employer that provides retirement benefits through a county retirement system.

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The PERL generally defines final compensation as the highest average pensionable income by a member over a 12- or 36-month period. Let's assume person A's final compensation calculated using the PERL's definition of pensionable income was earned at the end of their career and was \$120,000. The Legislature created a specific definition of final compensation for reciprocal members. Person B's final compensation period does not have to be during a time they were a CalPERS member the first 10 years of their career. Reciprocity allows person B's final compensation period to be during any 12- or 36-month period of time they worked under the county system.

Remember, the individuals had identical careers, so common sense would dictate their final compensation amounts are the same. Even though person B never earned \$120,000 as a CalPERS member - it was earned at the end of the career - this would be their final compensation amount.

Respondents in this case are receiving this

advantage. Their CalPERS benefits are based on the higher amount they earned while a county system employee. However, they want more.

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Going back to my example, let's assume both people accrue six months of vacation leave during their careers. Person -- for person A, the PERL explicitly says vacation leave is not pensionable. However, the county system counts vacation leave as pensionable income. And person B's pensionable income is now \$180,000, 120,000 in income, plus 60,000 for the cash-out of six months leave.

This means person B's final compensation is not \$10,000 per month, but \$15,000 per month. Person B wants to have a final compensation amount that is 50 percent greater than person A. This example illustrates precisely the argument being made by respondents, that the county retirement law and the county system dictate the retirement allowance CalPERS must pay respondents, because the county system counts vacation cash-outs as pensionable income.

And for these respondents, it is not just vacation leave cashouts they seek to include. They also want to include sick leave cashouts, administrative compensation cashouts, cell phone and automobile allowances. The list goes on. The respondents admit that these items do not qualify as pensionable income under the

PERL. But despite this fact, respondents argue CalPERS must include these items when calculating their CalPERS pensionable income, simply because they qualify under the county system.

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Respondents' argument has repeatedly been rejected by this Board, as well as the court of appeal in Stillman v. Fresno County Employees Retirement Association. The court in Stillman analyzed a final compensation statute nearly identical to the one found in the PERL. The court found that reciprocity allows a member to use their final compensation period the time they worked under the reciprocal system, and that is all reciprocity does. Reciprocity does not create a new definition of pensionable income that applies only to reciprocal members.

The respondents in this case are making the same argument rejected in Stillman. They argued the PERL statute defining final compensation for reciprocal members creates a new definition of pensionable income. Not only did the court in Stillman reject this argument, this Board has repeatedly rejected this argument. Reciprocity allows respondents to use, as their final compensation period, the time they received while -- the pensionable income they received while a CalPERS member.

The court -- the court in Stillman ruled that

non-pensionable compensation, the vacation cashouts, do not become pensionable simply because the employer paid it. And this same rule applies to every single CalPERS member. An employer can agree to pay an employee an amount it deems proper. However, this Board, based on the PERL, decides whether the pay is pensionable. The same rule that applies to over a million CalPERS members should app -- also apply to these five respondents.

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Because the PERL, and not the county retirement law determines what compensation qualifies as pensionable, we must now determine what items of pay should be included in respondents' final compensation amount.

Respondents stipulated to the fact that most of the items excluded by CalPERS do not qualify as pensionable income under the PERL. However, there are two items still in dispute, respondents Wheeler, Valdez, and Cohoe each received an item of pay based on their longevity, being at the top step of their position salary range, and merit.

They argue the pay qualifies as special compensation under the PERL. To qualify as special compensation, the item must be on the exclusive list promulgated by this Board in Code of Regulations section 571(a). The pay received by these respondents is not on the list. It combines two items that are, longevity and

merit, but also adds a third component not recognized by the PERL, being on the top step of a position salary range.

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The court of appeal in DiCarlo v. county of Monterey analyzed an item nearly identical to the one these respondents received and found that it does not qualify as special compensation under the PERL.

Respondent Cohoe argues in the alternative that his pay, called top of range merit pay, qualifies as pay rate. However, pay rate is base pay for services rendered on a full-time basis. Top of range merit pay is not base pay. It is pay in excess of base pay for employees who are at the maximum pay rate for more than 36 months who perform superior work.

The disputed items of pay received by respondents Wheeler, Valdez, and Cohoe simply do not qualify as pensionable income under the PERL, and should be excluded when determining their final compensation.

The Legislature created reciprocity to ensure that public employees can change employers and retirement systems without suffering unnecessary hardships. However, the Legislature recognized the impact that reciprocity has on retirement systems, and may clear that the retirement system should only be liable for its just financial obligation. The Legislature, in creating reciprocity, did

not eliminate this Board's fiduciary duty to determine and control the amount of benefits it pays all members, including reciprocal members.

If respondents' appeals are granted, if the proposed decision is adopted, this Board will accept the following statement as true, the county system and the county retirement law dictate the benefits CalPERS pays reciprocal members. This Board would no longer have the ability to manage and control the system, and CalPERS would have no way of ensuring it is only liable for its just financial obligation.

In fact, CalPERS will be required to make retirement payments on compensation this Board and the legislature has explicitly deemed not pensionable. This is why this Board should deny respondents' appeals.

Thank you.

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PRESIDENT JONES: Thank you, Mr. Shipley.

Please start the clock for 10 minutes for Mr.

19 Silver to present the members' argument.

MR. SILVER: Thank you. After listening to what Mr. Shipley said, I think you need to be very mindful of a couple of things that were left out of his presentation that are very, very relevant to this case.

The first is that as the CalPERS witness testified at the hearing, for over 60 years CalPERS

applied the retirement law exactly the way the administrative law judge interpreted, okay? It was only very recently that CalPERS shifted gears and changed its position, okay?

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Secondly, what Mr. Shipley overlooked, he gives you this wonderful -- these wonderful examples about how the world should be and how wonderful it is, but what he doesn't tell you is what the statute that applies says.

And if you look at Government Code section 20638, which is directly on point, and it's a very short and simple statute. It says the highest annual average compensation during any consecutive 12- or 36-month period of employment as a member of a county retirement system. So it says the highest compensation earned with the county shall be considered compensation earnable by a member of this system for purposes of computing final compensation for the member.

So what this statute tells you, and what CalPERS and the county did for 60 years, is that if you have a reciprocal situation like these and the individual's highest year is with the county, you look at the highest average -- excuse me, highest annual average compensation earned with the county. It does not say anything about saying, well, it's the highest annual average compensation earned by the county, but you subtract from that items of

pay that are pensionable under the county system, but not pensionable under the PERS system. It doesn't say that, okay? And for 60 years, CalPERS didn't take that position. Now, all of a sudden, it is.

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I think maybe one thing we all need to be mindful of, as Mr. Chirag said. This is purely a legal issue. There's no factual dispute in this particular case. And it's a very complicated and complex legal issue. I don't know how many of you, if any, are experienced in adjudicating complicated and complex legal issues. I know I'm not, and I've been a lawyer for 54 years. I've argued some very complicated cases, but I haven't decided any. I haven't adjudicated any.

And I think it's incumbent upon you to respect the person that the law has determined should be making these legal determinations, the administrative law judge. I just can't see how you or I could just blindly overturn the decision of an expert because we don't like it.

He's -- he was the one charged by law. He's an experienced adjudicator, and you should give extreme deference to his decision.

Now, one of the reasons for that is, is that this is a very, very complicated case. CalPERS staff has relied upon four or five different statutes at various stages of this proceeding. It started out relying upon

Government Code section 20351. And all the letters that were sent to these individuals, that's the code section it relied upon.

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After, I think we were able to convince them at the hearing that that section really didn't have anything to do with this reciprocal retirement, they kind of shifted gears and started talking about Government Code section 20636, 20630.

Now, after that doesn't seem to get them anywhere, they're relying upon a decision that interprets a Government Code section, section 31835 that has no application to PERS. It is a reciprocity statute dealing with the county and a private retirement system. The -- as I said before, the statute that clearly applies is Government code section 20638.

But I have to tell you, as somebody who's been doing this for a long time, this -- again, this is very complicated, which statute does apply? Do you want to read 20351 or do you want to read, you know, 20366, or whatever.

The administrative law judge did that. He spent a couple of months deliberating over this very complicated case and he came up with a conclusion. And I, with all due respect, and I hope you don't hold this against my clients, I'm not sure any of you have the same time,

energy, or expertise as the administrative law judge, and deference should be given to that person's decision.

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As I pointed out, the key section is Government Code section 206 -- 20638. CalPERS interpreted it the way we are advocating for 60 years. There is a judicial doctrine that says the contemporaneous administrative interpretation by an agency charged with this inter -- or its implementation must be given due deference. You should be giving deference to the CalPERS 60-year determination. That's what the -- this particular legal principle says.

I guess the last thing I'd like to say, and I think this is -- this is very important, and the administrative law judge picked up on it, is that CalPERS changed its position again after 60 years. It did it after these individuals retired. If these individuals had known that CalPERS was going to be changing its position and using a lower final compensation base, they probably would have delayed their retirement, so they could pick up extra service credit or pay raises in order to get the pension that they felt they needed to live on for the rest of their lives.

These people again they relied in good faith upon the way CalPERS has been determining -- interpreting this section. And to now pull the rug out from under them is

completely wrong.

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And what I would suggest and urge is that if you really feel that the interpretation of the law is as Mr. Shipley contends, and that's the way CalPERS should be interpreting it, I would urge you strongly to do it only prospectively, so that individuals who are still employed will have an opportunity to make a decision as to when to retire, based upon this brand new interpretation of the law.

I think what I would urge you to do is -- is in this particular case, maybe dismiss the statement of issues, so you don't even have to render a decision against these individuals. Let them get with everybody, what they each anticipated they would get, based upon CalPERS' 60 years of interpreting this, and just take a position prospectively, so that individuals in the future will make decisions as to when to retire with their eyes open.

I think it's a terrible injustice to apply a new position to people who have already retired, who didn't have a chance to react to it. And to pull out the rug out from under them I think is completely inappropriate. So I would urge you to again only consider that if you are convinced that -- that notwithstanding section 20638 and notwithstanding the contemporaneous administrative

interpretation, and notwithstanding the administrative law judge's clear -- clearly articulated decision that CalPERS needs to do it the way Mr. Shipley says, do it only in the future. Don't do it to people who've already retired, who don't have a chance to take it into account in making their decision to retire.

Thank you.

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PRESIDENT JONES: Thank you, Mr. Silver.

Mr. Shipley, would you like to offer a rebuttal?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Yes, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Would you please start the clock for three minutes for staff's rebuttal.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Thank you.

Mr. Silver is correct in that this is purely a legal issue. And the court of appeal has repeatedly addressed the issue before this Board. The case in Stillman that I discussed said that each retirement system uses the definitions that are in their law. So CalPERS applies the definitions in the PERL, and the county system applies the definitions contained therein.

Stillman did not involve a private retirement system. It involved two public retirement systems that enjoyed reciprocity. Respondents have called this decision disturbing - that's their words, not mine - but it's the law. In the DiCarlo matter, the court said you

can't combine two items of special compensation.

Respondents called that case ridiculous, but it's the law, and CalPERS has to follow the law.

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Now, respondents main argument is that CalPERS has somehow done an about-face, that we've changed things that had been done repeatedly for 60 years. This is simply not true. This court, as -- or this Board, as I've discussed, has repeatedly issued determinations, has issued decisions that CalPERS must apply law. And these were based on letters that were sent in 2015, 2016, prior to any decision, prior to any determination for respondents. That was CalPERS decision then, and it was CalPERS determination and decision prior to that.

The court of -- the administrative law judge relied on a decision involving a CalPERS reciprocal member Block. And it was a court of appeal case where he reciprocally retired with the Orange County Retirement System. And in that case, the court of appeal said and found that CalPERS calculated his final compensation amount to be \$6,793. The Orange County Retirement System Calculated the final compensation amount to be \$7,021.

So there's a difference. The CalPERS final compensation amount is different than the Orange County compensation amount. This case -- in that case, Mr. Block retired in 2002. The court of appeal decision was issued

in 2008. So it simply can't be true that CalPERS has always used the final compensation amounts from county retirement systems, when in 2002 we were making separate different determinations than the county systems.

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And I want to end by saying the respondents are receiving the benefits that the Legislature provided them through reciprocity. They each stopped being an active Calpers member 15, 20, 30 years ago, and they retired recently. And when Calpers calculated their final compensation amount, they're using the compensation as defined in the PERL that they received from these county systems. So they're receiving a much higher final compensation amount, as they're entitled to, but they're not entitled to receive amounts that aren't in the law.

PRESIDENT JONES: Thank you.

Mr. Silver, would you like to offer rebuttal?

MR. SILVER: Yes, I have --

PRESIDENT JONES: Start the clock for three minutes.

MR. SILVER: I have trouble understanding Mr. Shipley can say that the -- CalPERS have not relied upon this for 60 years, when the uncontradicted evidence in the record -- and I urge you to read page 42, line 20 through page 48, line 13 of the administrative record, where the CalPERS witness herself admitted that for 60 years this is

the -- CalPERS interpreted it the way we advocate. I mean, for Mr. Shipley to disregard that clear, uncontradicted evidence of his own witness just befuddles me. I cannot understand that.

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The other things that -- he relies upon the Block case. Well, actually, as we said in our argument, which I hope you have read, we quoted a portion of the Block decision, which the administrative law judge relied upon, that basically said that if you have a reciprocal situation, you're regarded as having worked your entire career for the latter agency, in that case, the County of Orange, okay?

So you have to assume that these individuals worked their entire careers. And that all the income they earned was the same as what they earned with the respective counties, Los Angeles and San Bernardino.

The -- if you go to my argument on page six, you'll see a quote, it -- from Block, which says, "A purpose an effect of these reciprocity provisions are to treat a member retiring concurrently...as having been employed by a single employer and having been a member of a single retirement system for the member's entire career, for purposes of calculating retirement benefits". And then it says, "As applied here, reciprocity means Block would be entreated as having..." -- "...would be treated

as having served his entire career as an employee with the Orange County Fire Authority...".

So I think that you have to do the same thing for these individual, assume that their entire careers were with either L.A. County or San Bernardino County.

Finally, I'd like to talk about Mr. Cohoe situation. The top of the range merit pay, the CalPERS witness acknowledged was the same as a step increase, a pay step increase. You have many employees who have situations where they go to step 1, step 2, step 3, step 4. You include step 5, even though it is a longevity step, as part of the pay rate.

Finally, the last thing I want to say about Mr. Cohoe is if you -- if you do reject the decision, you shouldn't be deciding Mr. Cohoe and the other individual situations independently. That should be sent back to the administrative law judge, because he never decided those issues.

PRESIDENT JONES: Your time is up, sir.

MR. SILVER: Thank you.

PRESIDENT JONES: Thank you.

Now, it's an opportunity for Board members to ask questions.

Ms. Hollinger.

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BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Yeah. My question is to

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you, Mr. Shah. When you have these reciprocal pension
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    systems and then you come into PERL's is -- does -- is
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    there something that says that PERL supersedes, like...
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                        When you come into the PERL, well,
             MR. SHAH:
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    there's nothing specific in the law that says the PERL --
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Move your mic, Mr. Shah.
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                          Yes, there is.
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             MR. SILVER:
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             PRESIDENT JONES: No. Excuse me, sir.
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   not --
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             MR. SILVER:
                          He's wrong.
             PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Silver, that is out of
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    order.
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             Chiraq.
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             MR. SHAH:
                        That's fine. You should give Mr.
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    Silver an opportunity to --
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             BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Okay. I will.
             MR. SHAH: -- to have his say as well. But
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    there's nothing specific in the PERL that says that.
                                                           It's
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    just something that staff is arguing pursuant to a
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    standard statutory construction.
             BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Right. But it's not
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    like if you have a conflict of laws issues between state
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    and federal that federal law supersedes.
                                               There's
    nothing -- I'm asking if there's anything actually
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    written?
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MR. SHAH: There is nothing specific to that fact, but --

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Okay.

MR. SHAH: Yes, go ahead.

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BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: And my other question to you is this, is when -- when they retired, what -- what did they count on when they were computing their benefits at the time of retirement?

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Was the -- I'm not clear if PERL was in effect, the reciprocity agreement, did it come after the fact?

MR. SHAH: What did the members count on?

MR. SHAH: The reciprocity agreements, to my understanding, have been in place since 1957. So they were always in place throughout.

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Got it.

MR. SILVER: Can I respond to that?

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Yes.

MR. SILVER: Because I think I -- I think your question is what happened when these individuals retired? When these individuals retired, their pensions were calculated based upon the County Employees Retirement Law definition of final compensation. It was only after they retired that these proceedings were initiated to undue that.

So originally, they were being treated the way we claim they should be treated, and then CalPERS jumped in and said, woops, we're changing -- we're changing things, and we're going to undue that. And that's what this case is all about. It's undoing what was done correctly.

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BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: And, Mr. Shah, you would say to that?

MR. SHAH: My job obviously is not to dispute anything. Mr. Silver has to report to the Board.

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: No, I'm not asking you to dispute it.

MR. SHAH: My understanding is that the staff was upholding its duty to correct errors under Section 20160 of the PERL.

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: So is the disparity then that the -- they weren't given the proper information at the time or -- at the time they -- is this an audit function?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: May I briefly address that?

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Yes.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Calpers staff, as it normally does when somebody retires, underwent an -- underwent an analysis to determine what amounts would be included. And so then it sent determination letters to

the members saying that these amounts would be included or would not be included. On some of the members, there was repeated kind of amended determinations. Once additional information was provided, CalPERS said okay, well, now that you've explained exactly what that item of pay is, we can increase your final compensation.

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But this is -- this was not part of an audit. It was part of the normal process that CalPERS undergoes where members retire, the county system gives CalPERS -- there's forms and there's --

BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Got it.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: -- in the record, and then CalPERS undergoes as analysis, requests information from the county, employers of the county system, and sometimes it was forthcoming really fast, sometimes it took time to get the amounts. So then amended determinations were -- but it was not part of an audit. It was just part of the normal process that CalPERS undergoes when it attempts to verify for all members whether the reported amount of compensation actually complies with the PERL.

MR. SILVER: Yes. But I think it's important to emphasize this was done well after these individuals retired. When they retired, it was done correctly. And then Calpers came in and said, woops, we think it was

wrong, and now we're going to reduce your retirement allowance.

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BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Thank you.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Ms. Taylor.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Thank you.

Mr. Silver, you keep using the witness in here.

And I read through that. She didn't acknowledge that it's been going on for 60 years in any way, that I'm reading.

She says, "I think once we became aware that other reciprocal systems were routinely using items that blatantly -- that we specifically exclude under our law, and seeing that our own members, our contributing members were subject to limitations that other systems were not using, we wanted to be consistent and we determined that we needed to start looking closer, so that we could identify these instances".

And then you guys tried to get her to say that it's at least since 1997 that you -- we're doing it. But before '97 you weren't, and she couldn't acknowledge that, so -- but what I will ask you -- so I'm not seeing that for 60 years we've done this.

MR. SILVER: Well, if I can respond. The 60 years is the date from the inception of --

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Right.

MR. SILVER: -- what is now 20638. It was

20023.1 before they renumbered everything. From that date forward, they interpreted it a certain way. And she said that they changed their interpretation.

PRESIDENT JONES: She didn't say that.

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MR. SILVER: She said it was recently when they changed their interpretation.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Right. You're saying that she said that she -- they changed it, but she didn't --

MR. SILVER: I think she said recently.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: -- say specifically when and you tried to nail her on, oh, was it before '97. It doesn't really matter. What --

MR. SILVER: Well, our stipulation also indicates that this was done recently. If you look at the stipulated facts it says that this was done recently. There's some excuse in there about how your program system or whatever couldn't figure it out for 60 years. But basically --

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Well, understand that we didn't have reciprocal for 60 years either right?

MR. SILVER: Yes, you did. The statute has been in place for 60 years.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: The CERL didn't -- the CERL didn't come into effect until 1950 something.

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MR. SILVER: Well, that's 60 years. 1 VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: '57. 2 MR. SILVER: That's sixty years. 3 VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Okay. Mr. Shipley, are 4 you -- all right. You were shaking your head there, so... 5 SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Well, I just -- you 6 7 know, when you look at the stipulation -- and this is a 8 stipulated fact, it says that when CalPERS would did --9 would become aware that items were being reported, CalPERS has and will conduct independent reviews. And so 10 that's -- you know, maybe -- that's what the stipulated 11 facts say, that when CalPERS became aware of something, 12 they would conduct reviews. And --1.3 VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: So it doesn't go back any 14 specific time. Oh, we didn't start doing this until. 15 16 SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: No. And as I indicated, the Block decision shows that, you know, 17 that -- that member retired in 2002. CalPERS used a 18 19 different final compensation amount than Orange County. 20 If we used the exact same number that Orange County provided us, the amounts couldn't be different. 21 2.2 would have to be the same. But we used a different final 23 compensation amount to calculate that member's benefits. So there's simply no evidence that CalPERS for 60 24 25 years just went with whatever this -- the reciprocal

system provided us. If we knew that there was something that was not reportable under the PERL, Calpers has and will conduct independent reviews.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Okay. So -- and I remember reading that.

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Also, Mr. Silver, the employee does get all the compensation from the county that is their view of pensionable compensation, right? They get that from the County. They get a separate check from the county with all of this stuff that you're saying that CalPERS should also include, but they do get a check from the county with their pensionable compensation, right?

MR. SILVER: Of course, yeah.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Okay. So CalPERS doesn't allow any of its other employees to get any of that pensionable compensation. So it doesn't make sense that we would, if we find out that a county is including that, that we would include that in any way. It's not -- it's not a fair interpretation of the law for the rest of the employees. And I believe it would -- I can't speak to this. I'm not an actuary. But it would throw our actuarial rates off as well. So I can see what you're saying, but it doesn't make sense that we would just ignore the PERL and move into accepting whatever the CERL says.

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MR. SILVER: Well, two things. One, you may be 1 right in terms of what's fair, but that's not what the law 2 says. Government Code section 20638 doesn't say that 3 you --VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: It doesn't say we have to 5 take that though. It's not --6 7 MR. SILVER: It says -- it says the highest 8 average --VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: For CERL not for PERL. 9 It didn't say it for CERL. 10 MR. SILVER: But that's what you use. That's 11 what you use. 20638 is a reciprocity provision. It says 12 the highest annual average compensation, blah, blah, blah, 1.3 as a member of a county system shall be considered 14 compensation earnable by a member of this system. And 15 16 this is in the Public Employees' Retirement Law. is --17 VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: The system meaning our 18 19 system? 20 MR. SILVER: Yes. It's because part of -VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Our system, not the CERL. 21 MR. SILVER: Yeah, it says -- no, it says you use 2.2 23 the highest average -- annual average compensation earned

as a member of a county retirement system. That shall be

considered compensation earnable by a member of this

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system, CalPERS. That's exactly what it says.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: So you're interpreting that differently than I would.

Go ahead, Mr. Shipley.

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MR. SILVER: Well, that's the way the -- as I say, that's the way it was interpreted for a long time. It was interpreted that way when these individuals retired. That's the most important thing of all. When they retired, that's the way it was interpreted. It was only after they retired that a different interpretation was employed.

And again, what I -- what I would urge you, and maybe this is -- you're the best person to have this conversation with, is that if you really feel strongly --

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: She's the attorney.

MR. SILVER: Pardon?

Well, if you really feel strongly that this is the way the law should be interpreted, you should do it prospectively, not retroactively for people who made decisions to retire and relied upon those decisions. If you want to do it prospectively, you know, hey, take your best shot. But it's not fair to do it to these people who rely to their detriment upon what CalPERS has been doing for a long time.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Shipley, you want --

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I would simply go back 1 to the court in Stillman was interpreting a nearly 2 identical statute. That statute said average compensation 3 during any period of service as a member of a reciprocal 4 5 system shall be considered compensation earnable or pensionable compensation. And the court of appeal in 6 Stillman said that that does not mean the county system 7 8 simply ignores its own definitions. It still has to apply 9 its own definition.

And in the case, 20638 contains the exact same language. And there's definition for compensation in the PERL, it's 20630, and there's definition for compensation earnable, 20636. And in every determination letter that was sent to the respondents, it said those are the laws, those are the statutes that apply, and that's the law.

MR. SILVER: That's not true.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: And I --

PRESIDENT JONES: Excuse me.

MR. SILVER: That's not true. In every

20 determination --

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Silver.

MR. SILVER: -- letter they relied upon --

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Silver, I'm going to turn

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MR. SILVER: -- section 20351.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Silver, I'm going to turn your mic off if you keep interrupting until you're called upon.

MR. SILVER: Well, if Mr. Shipley would be accurate, I wouldn't have to do that.

PRESIDENT JONES: But no, you should do it any way.

MR. SILVER: Well, excuse me

PRESIDENT JONES: So -- all right.

VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: And I just --

11 PRESIDENT JONES: Finish your comment, Mr.

12 Shipley.

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I'd be happy to direct the Board's attention to State's Exhibit 21, which was Attachment G in the record. And that is the determination letter sent to Mr. Valdez dated July 5th, 2016. And in that letter, the CalPERS staff quotes, "The compensation does not meet the definition of compensation and compensation earnable as provided in Government Code sections 20630 and 20636". Then the letters continue to basically cite -- to recite those definitions.

And so to say that CalPERS didn't rely at all on 20630 or 20636 is simply not true. 20351, all that statute does is it says there can be reciprocity. And we acknowledge there can be reciprocity. The simple fact is

we still rely on those definitions. And those are the definitions included in all of the determination letters that were sent to these respondents.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. I'm going to move to another question from Board member --

MR. SILVER: Okay. Can I just respond for one second?

PRESIDENT JONES: Just one second.

Go ahead.

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MR. SILVER: Oh, I'm sorry.

Yeah, but what those letters do not mention is Government Code section 20638, the one that's directly on point. I just wanted to say that.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Ms. Brown.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Shipley, did the ALJ consider the Stillman decision in making they're finding?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: It's difficult to say exactly to what extent the administrative law judge considered the Stillman decision. He does reference the decision in the -- in the corrected proposed decision. However, he seems to indicate that -- that Calpers has not consistently applied Stillman, and so it doesn't apply. But that's simply, as I've said and argued, it's simply not true. So there's really -- the ALJ seems to kind of

just skip over the holdings of Stillman, which say CalPERS applies the PERL and the county system applies the CERL.

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BOARD MEMBER BROWN: As I read it, it appeared that the judge looked at it and rejected it, but let me ask Mr. Silver.

MR. SILVER: Well, I think he -- you're right, he looked at it and actually applied it favorably towards -- towards the position we're advocating. But I think -- again, I have to emphasize, Stillman interpreted a statute that has nothing to do with PERS. It's a statute between a system covered by the County Employees Retirement Law, and then an independent system, the San Luis Obispo County Employees Retirement System.

Second of all, if you read the Stillman opinion, it does not explain at all how it comes to its conclusion. It simply says, and that's all it does. If you read the Stillman position -- decision carefully, it says -- it talks about this and so and so, or it says that they're the same, but that's all it does. It doesn't explain why it wouldn't include the same items of pay that are pensionable under the other system.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: And, Mr. Silver, how -- how long did members receive their pensions before this recalculation or this error was noted?

MR. SILVER: I'm not 100 percent sure.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Let me see if our staff knows.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Well, I can tell you that --

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: I know it varies, because there's different people.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Right. I'll say for Mr. Blackwell, his retirement date was January 31st, 2017. And the initial determination letter went out in May, May 8th 2017, so four months.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Okay.

January retirement and an April letter that went out. So it varies, but it was typically with -- you know, approximately three -- three months or so. And part of that delay is because CalPERS has to initially receive the information from the county system. So it can't really make a calculation until it actually receives, and there's forms and they're in the record from the county system telling CalPERS, okay, well, here's the amount and here's how it's broke down.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Thank you.

Mr. Silver

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MR. SILVER: Yeah. I think that misses the point. The point is is that they didn't know about it

before they retired. And when they went -- most of these -- this isn't in the record, but I can tell you based upon my experience with an awful lot of retirees that I get contacted by, they all go to -- most of them go to the CalPERS office, and they, you know, work out exactly what their retirement allowance is going to be. They get an estimate. They get something and they figure this is what my pension is going to be. And that's, I'm sure, what these individuals did is that they -- and so they decided to retire on that date.

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Had they known that their pensions would be lower, as the administrative law judge recognized, they probably would have delayed their retirement, so they could get that amount using the CalPERS approach by getting additional service credit or maybe some pay raises.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Thank you. Mr. Shipley, I have another question for you. Has staff recently started looking at the reciprocal agreements? Is this something -- we keep hearing that this is something new we're doing. And I'm just wondering did it come to our attention may be in '97, or whatever that date is that we're hearing, that we had these issues, and so staff started focusing more on that, or how did this -- I'm just trying to figure out how this error came to staff's

attention --

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I don't know if -BOARD MEMBER BROWN: -- and is it more recent?
SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I don't know if it -if I would consider it an error, as much as it was -- in
the way this -- the kind of evidence plays -- lays out
what happened is there was -- staff became aware that
there was more and more of a discrepancy between what was
being reported by the county system and what's allowed by
Calpers. And I think if you look at the prior appeals
that have been heard by this Board, a lot of those
determinations were 2015, 2016.

And so I would think that there -- I would say, based on that, that there's probably more of an awareness going back to around that time. And that's when, as the stipulated facts kind of indicate, CalPERS did put more resources into making sure that the reported amounts qualify. But that's -- I don't know if there's an exact date of Cal -- there wasn't an audit where CalPERS said, oh, wait, there's -- but it was just simply a matter of through, you know, reviewing more and more of the reported amounts, that the items that were being reported don't qualify under the PERL. And so that's when CalPERS started making determinations and informing the county systems as well that this is not something --

minute, Mr. Silver. So -- and I understand how our staff does that retirement. They give you an estimate. You actually might even get a couple of paychecks. And then as they go back and look into it, they make an adjustment. My -- in my case I got more money.

But again, I understand that's our standard process. I'm just wondering if we're looking harder at reciprocal agreements, because we have these issues -- more issues with county or whatever is going on.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I would -- I would say it's not necessarily with the agreement, because the statutes basically say there is reciprocity.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Um-hmm.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: It's more with how the county system reports income to CalPERS, and so CalPERS is requiring and requesting more detailed information, so we can exactly see what -- what that final compensation amount is based upon.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Great.

Mr. Silver

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MR. SILVER: Well, again, I just direct your attention to the stipulation. The stipulation in paragraph 2 says in the past CalPERS didn't have an automated system and couldn't do this. And then in

paragraph 3, the first word, and I think it's the keyword is "recently". So this is something that has been changed very recently.

BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Thank you.

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PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Silver, in your scenario that we should rely on what the county determines to be compensation. And as you know, I don't know, we have what 58 counties in the state. And so does that -- in your scenario, does that mean that CalPERS would have to rely on not only CalPERS' rules and regulations, but also rules and regulations from 58 different counties, which could be very different for each county.

MR. SILVER: Yeah, well, first of all, there's only 20 counties covered by the County Employees Retirement Law.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Twenty.

MR. SILVER: And second of all, they don't determine what is pensionable income independent. The County Employees Retirement Law defines what is pensionable income, and they all are supposed to comply with the County Employees Retirement Law. They don't get to make independent determinations

PRESIDENT JONES: So who determines what compensation is?

MR. SILVER: The County Employees Retirement Law

does.

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PRESIDENT JONES: And Calpers -- for Calpers, it's a different interpretation of compensation.

MR. SILVER: It would be, if there wasn't reciprocity. But with reciprocity, section 20638 says you use the county's. As I've read before, it says you use the county's definition of compensation, not Calpers'.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. -- Go ahead, you want to respond to that?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I think I've responded.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I think the law is clear that Calpers uses the PERL and the county system uses the CERL.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Okay. Mr. Slaton.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Thank you, Mr. President.

I want to come back to this just so I can understand the timing of things. So when these people decided to retire, we started issuing a check, CalPERS did, along with the county issuing a check, is that true? Is that correct?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Yes, that's essentially true, once they retired.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. All right. So -- and how did we determine the amount of that check, CalPERS

check?

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Calpers would request -- there's a form that Calpers uses that the county system or the reciprocal system would submit to Calpers that would provide kind of the final compensation period, as well as the final compensation amount, and then provide a breakdown of what's included in that final compensation amount.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. So before we can issue a check, we have to get a document from the county that specifies three things, the amount of time worked, the final compensation, and the breakdown of the final compensation, is that accurate?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: The only thing I would -- I think the form does indicate the amount of time worked in the county system. However, Calpers would only use the service credit, the amount of time worked in the --

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: No, I -- okay. You're right.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: But, yeah.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: But let's focus on the amount. So the highest compensation, that's a single dollar amount that's reported by the county. Plus, we require a breakdown of that number, is that correct?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: That's correct.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. So in this particular -- this particular case, did we receive a breakdown?

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Yes, we received breakdowns for these individuals.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. And what did we do with that breakdown, in terms of calculating what was pensionable according to the PERL?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: We would take the breakdown, and it's itemized. And so we would then look -- and usually it's itemized as kind of base pay or pay rate.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Right.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: And we could conform that that was pay rate that was on a publicly available pay schedule.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Right.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: And then there would be typically items of kind of additional compensation or special compensation. Sometimes, there would be details to allows the staff to determine what exactly it is. And then staff, as it does with every other Calpers member, would then determine does that comply with the definition of pensionable income under the PERL.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. So in this case, the initial determination you were not able to tell items that should have been excluded apparently?

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I don't know if I would say that that's 100 percent accurate. I think that for some of the members, it was easier than others. And so for some, it was clear from the beginning that certain items were excluded and certain items were allowed. And that's why, if you look at some of the members, there's two or three determination letters. We would ask for more information to try to clarify does it count or not?

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: But every single person who's subject to this procedure or process has something that was subsequently excluded after the initial calculation --

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I don't know -BOARD MEMBER SLATON: -- of the Calpers portion.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I'm sorry. I don't know if I would say it was subsequently excluded. I think if it was readily apparent to CalPERS at the time it was making its initial kind of determination on what the retirement allowance should be, it was excluded. There wasn't -- it wasn't a situation where they included it, and then later excluded it always. There might have been situations like that, but CalPERS would take the

information it has and try to make that determination from the onset. But then, as we do with all members, sometimes we have to do further investigation to see if something additionally should be included, as I think Ms. Brown indicated, or excluded.

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BOARD MEMBER SLATON: So this is that three or four month period after retirement, where we did further clarification with the employer regarding those items.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Correct.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. It seems to me one solution is you start the check with the base compensation, and then you resolve those issues, and you add that or you don't add that afterwards, but, you notify the employee prior to their retirement what the minimum amount is they're going to have. Has that -- has that ever been considered or done?

My scope of expertise. I think the general practice is to try to -- to basically try to provide the member with the retirement allowance they're entitled to as quickly as possible. And so we want to try to provide them with what we think is correct as quickly as possible, and then later in that two or three month period --

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: I see. Okay.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: But I think it's

something that can be considered, but I think the members, you know, when they retire if the check is only based on a base amount and yet they're really entitled to more, the members would probably want that.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Well, I'm just getting to the point of at least not being -- having a surprise -- a negative surprise later --

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Right.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: -- after you've already made the retirement decision.

Mr. Silver, did you have --

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MR. SILVER: Well, that's exactly what happened here was they got the negative surprise after the fact, after they'd already retired, and they had their allowance reduced. And I think --

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Did -- and one other question. Did these respondents approach CalPERS directly to determine the level of assurance that the number was accurate?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Actually, I was just wanting to address that, because the record contains no evidence whatsoever that any of these respondents went to Calpers to ask for retirement estimate, that they, you know, somehow said, okay, this is what my estimate is going to be and that's what they did. There's absolutely

no evidence to that in the record whatsoever.

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Mr. Silver kind of hypothesized of what his experience is. But as far as these respondents -- and we've seen cases where respondents will repeatedly come to CalPERS and ask for a retirement estimate. These respondents there's just simply no evidence that they did that or, in any way, relied on a higher estimate that CalPERS provided when they decided to retire.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: So that raises one last question. What if they had, what would they have been told by Calpers?

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I think they would have been told what all members are told is that we provide an estimate based on the best information we're provided. If the county had provided CalPERS with a breakdown that included these items that are allowable, as well as these items that aren't allowed, CalPERS would have provided an estimate only based on the items that are allowed. That's what CalPERS strives to do. There's times where we later have to correct a mistake. And that happens, and I know the Board is aware of that.

But that's what CalPERS would have done. They would have asked for information, and they would have tried to get as much information as possible to allow it to provide an accurate estimate. That was -- there's

evidence -- there's no evidence at least that any of that happened in this case.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Mr. Silver.

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MR. SILVER: Well, if you really think that is the determinative factor, I would suggest that the appropriate remedy might be to send the case back to the administrative law judge to take evidence on that particular issue, because I can't testify on their behalf. But I can tell you that at least a couple of them, and particularly Mr. Cohoe, have -- who was in constant communication with CalPERS and. Mr. Cohoe is a very intelligent and a very precise human being. And I am pretty confident he would tell you that before he retired, he assumed he was going to be getting what he originally got and then was later taken away from him.

BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Okay. All right. Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Rubalcava.

BOARD MEMBER RUBALCAVA: Thank you, Mr. Henry Jones.

This is a question for Mr. Shah. In your memo, which is very good by the way, you mentioned a lot of the -- of the court cases, Stillman. But one thing that I noticed was not in there -- and I recognize that these retirees are probably classic employees under PEPRA. But

the whole issue about pay items, whether compensation, or compensation earnable, that was really impacted by PEPRA. And I was wondering if you believe that perhaps some of the reason these issues are not coming to the front is because Calpers now has to be more vigilant about whether it meets that definition?

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And the other question I had was there was some dispute as to who makes -- determines what's compensation? Oh, and the answer was, you know, it's either State law or the '37 Act. But I think under PEPRA, each retirement system give -- using the guidance from CalPERS will determine for their system what is pensionable and what isn't.

Because I know some retirement systems, for example Ventura, took longer than others to come up with their determination as to which pay items made the cut or not.

So, Mr. Shah, do you think -- maybe I'm speculating too much, but would that have been an impact as to how CalPERS started looking at these, be more vigilant? Perhaps there will be more issues coming forward?

MR. SHAH: Well, Mr. Rubalcava, I reviewed the record exhaustively. There's no evidence in the record that any particular, you know, statutory action triggered

these reviews. I think it was -- my understanding is that it was just a part of the ordinary review process that CalPERS engages in. That's the first question.

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The second question who determines? That's really at issue here. CalPERS makes the determination. And the question is which -- which law would apply? And so CalPERS -- there's no question that CalPERS makes the determination though. The only issue is which law applies.

BOARD MEMBER RUBALCAVA: Thank you.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Ruffino.

ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Thank you, Mr. President.

This question is for Mr. Shipley or CalPERS staff. So we heard Mr. Silver in his -- in his opening remarks suggesting that perhaps we should implement this prospectively for the future -- future retirees. The question is what kind of effect would that have if assuming that we would want to adopt on the current?

And secondly, it was argued whether 60 years, 50 years, or 40 years that we've been using some sort of ruling, or some sort of precedent. Do we need to review to make that change or to make it known, or it has no bearing or no changes are necessary in order to make it clear that it's not necessarily a change of practice, as

has been presented?

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I think as to your first question on prospective or not, I think the law has been clear, and it hasn't changed. And so -- and I'll just kind of refer the Board to section 20004 of the PERL, which related to the Pension Reform Act of 2013. And through that, the Legislature said that the Board should continue to administer the fund in conformity with its duties an responsibilities, and to ensure that members are provided with retirement benefits to which they're entitled pursuant to the law.

And since the law hasn't changed, and since especially since Stillman has been decided, but that's the law. It hasn't changed. And so I don't see how we could in a prospective manner start enforcing, I guess, the law, when it's previously existed, and the Board has previously issued decisions on this exact issue, saying that the PERL and not the county law is what applies. So I -- I don't see how -- I mean, I can't tell you how -- how you rule. But I don't see how it can be done in a prospective manner when there isn't a change in the law.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay.

MR. SILVER: Can I just respond to that?

PRESIDENT JONES: Yes.

MR. SILVER: It certainly could be done in a --

what I'm saying should be done in a prospective manner is let everybody know before they retire, that -- whether you've been interpreting it this way in the past or not, let people, like my clients, who are still working, know that, hey, this is what's going to happen, so that when they select a retirement date, they'll know what their pension is going to be, and they won't have -- as I used the expression before, they won't have the rug pulled out from under them after the fact when it's too late to do anything about it.

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PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. -- do you have a -ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Just a quick.
PRESIDENT JONES: Go ahead.

ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Just a quick follow up, Mr. President.

So, Mr. Silver, are you suggesting right now that it's not clear -- when folks do submit an application retirement, it's not clear that all the -- everything that's been -- you know, that's considered in order to arrive at the final amount? I'm --

MR. SILVER: I would bet a lot of money that most people who have reciprocal situations, unless they're friends with people who've been affected by it, have no idea what you are now doing. But they do know that a lot of their friends retired in the past and were able to use

the county's calculations as their base. A lot of them know that.

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You know you're -- what really disturbs me about this is there are probably hundreds of thousands of individuals who have already retired who CalPERS staff could now go after today and say not only are we going to reduce your pension, but we want 30 years of, or 20 years of overpayments. And I've seen it happen. I've seen it happen in other situations.

And, you know, I assume that if they can do it to these five individuals, they can do it to those hundreds of thousands of people. I know -- for example, there's an awful lot of employees who work for a local agency -- I represent mostly firefighters and police officers, but many fire departments have been subsumed by counties, particularly Los Angeles County.

And with that happening, you've got a awful lot of employees who started their work with a local agency governed by PERS that went over to the county. And again, I know many of those individuals who retired 25, 30 years ago, who had it calculated the way we say it should be calculated. And if CalPERS staff has the time and energy they could literally go back and pull the rug out from under all these people.

That's why I think it should be done only to

people who understand it with their eyes open and make an intelligent decision as to when to retire.

PRESIDENT JONES: Mr. Miller.

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BOARD MEMBER MILLER: Thank you.

I think you really just answered the question I had, which is, you know, we've got these specific respondents in this case. But prior to this case, I'm sure there potentially sounds like there were a lot of other people who potentially could have been respondents, just depending on when CalPERS became aware or decided to pursue this issue. And So I'm just wondering if you have any other thoughts on that to share with us, Mr. Shah or either of the counsels?

MR. SHAH: I defer to staff counsel and members counsel on that.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: I would just simply say that, you know, CalPERS is required to apply the PERL.

The members are entitled to the benefits they're entitled to under the law. I'm not aware, and Mr. Silver is maybe trying to scare everybody into thinking that we're getting ready to yank everybody's retirement allowance and reduce it. There's simply no evidence to support that. And so -- well, there's no evidence to support it. And so to try to say that everybody is going to lose their retirement because of some new, you know, ruling, it's

simply -- there's just no evidence to support it, and
it's -- I don't believe it's true.

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MR. SILVER: Well, I apologize, but every — almost every month I get contacted by retirees, many of whom retired 15, 20 years ago who are innocent people — and we're not talking about the Robert Rizzos of the world. I mean, these are just normal working people who have gotten letters from CalPERS saying, by the way, you reported an item of pay that we used to think was pensionable, but we don't think is pensionable anymore, and we're going to reduce your allowance. And by the way, you owe us 15 years of overpayments. I get people contacting me like that on a regular basis. And I have no reason to believe why that won't happen here.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: And that simply just not true.

MR. SILVER: Well --

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: And if it was true, he should have testified at the hearing and he could have presented evidence to the administrative law judge and he didn't.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Mrs. Pasquil Rogers.

BOARD MEMBER PASQUIL ROGERS: Thank you, Mr.

Chair.

To the staff, is there a time limit on when you

can go back and -- of, you know, and reach out to retirees to say that we're going to -- we've noticed there's an error, could you possibly be going back 15 years?

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SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: No. There's -- in the mistake statute, there's a statute of limitations --

BOARD MEMBER PASQUIL ROGERS: Thank you.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: -- which apply how long Calpers can go back to collect overpayments from benefits that were paid to a member. And I think typically it would be three years, if there was an error, but it depends on the situation, but it wouldn't 15 years.

MR. SILVER: Well, excuse me, you should see some of the people who've come into my office and some of the letters they've received, Mr. Shipley. And I -- there must be somebody from CalPERS staff in the audience. I've seen -- I guarantee you those letters exist.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. This is --

MR. SILVER: It's not a three-year statute.

PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Seeing no additional questions from Board members, we're going to convene in our chambers and discuss this matter, and we'll return in open session to share what that decision is.

SENIOR ATTORNEY SHIPLEY: Thank you.

(Off record: 10:19 a.m.)

(Thereupon the meeting recessed

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into closed session.)
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             (Thereupon the meeting reconvened open session.)
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             (On record: 10:43 a.m.)
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. We are still on Board
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    Agenda Item number 3, the Wheeler, Valdez, et al. full
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   Board hearing.
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             Then we need to take another roll call to be sure
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    everybody is here that was here before.
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             Wait a minute. Just a minute.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Okay.
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             PRESIDENT JONES: See that's why we need roll
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   calls.
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             Okay.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Okay. Henry Jones?
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN:
                                         Theresa Taylor?
             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN:
                                         Margaret Brown?
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             BOARD MEMBER BROWN: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Rob Feckner?
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             BOARD MEMBER FECKNER: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Dana Hollinger?
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             BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Here.
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Adria Jenkins-Jones?
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             BOARD MEMBER JENKINS-JONES: Here.
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BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Frank Ruffino for
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    Fiona Ma?
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             ACTING BOARD MEMBER RUFFINO: Present.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: David Miller?
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             BOARD MEMBER MILLER: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Jason Perez?
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Excused.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Mona Pasquil Rogers?
             BOARD MEMBER PASQUIL ROGERS:
                                           Here.
9
             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Ramon Rubalcava?
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             BOARD MEMBER RUBALCAVA: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: Bill Slaton?
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             BOARD MEMBER SLATON: Here.
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             BOARD SECRETARY BUCHANAN: And Lynn Paquin for
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   Betty Yee.
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             ACTING BOARD MEMBER PAQUIN:
                                          Here.
             PRESIDENT JONES: Okay. Thank you.
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             At this time, I call on the Vice President, Ms.
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   Taylor.
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             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Thank you. I move to
   reject -- am I on.
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Wait, wait. Now, you're on.
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             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Oh, now I'm am.
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             PRESIDENT JONES: Okay.
             VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: I don't know that
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happened. 1 PRESIDENT JONES: I don't either. 2 3 VICE PRESIDENT TAYLOR: Oh, your magic. I move to reject the proposed decision of the 4 administrative law judge, deny the appeals, and issue a 5 revised final decision of the Board as argued by staff. 6 PRESIDENT JONES: Is there a second? 7 8 BOARD MEMBER HOLLINGER: Second. 9 PRESIDENT JONES: Second. Moved by Taylor, second by Ms. Hollinger. 10 11 All those in favor say aye? (Ayes.) 12 PRESIDENT JONES: Opposed? 1.3 Hearing none. The item is approved. 14 This meeting is adjourned. 15 16 (Thereupon the California Public Employees' Retirement System, Board of Administration 17 open session meeting adjourned at 10:45 a.m.) 18 19 20 21 2.2 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 1 I, JAMES F. PETERS, a Certified Shorthand 2 Reporter of the State of California, do hereby certify: 3 That I am a disinterested person herein; that the 4 foregoing California Public Employees' Retirement System, 5 Board of Administration open session meeting was reported 6 in shorthand by me, James F. Peters, a Certified Shorthand 7 8 Reporter of the State of California. 9 That the said proceedings was taken before me, in shorthand writing, and was thereafter transcribed, under 10 my direction, by computer-assisted transcription. 11 12

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said meeting nor in any way interested in the outcome of said meeting.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 25th day of February, 2019.

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James & James

JAMES F. PETERS, CSR Certified Shorthand Reporter License No. 10063