
CalPERS Trust Level Review Risk Management Summary

A CalPERS

Period Ending December 31, 2017

Investment Belief 9: Risk to CaIPERS is multi-faceted and not fully captured through measures such as volatility or tracking error. CaIPERS shall develop a broad set of investment and actuarial risk measures and clear processes for managing risk. The path of returns matters, because highly volatile returns can have unexpected impacts on contribution rates and funding status.

| Total Fund Forecast Volatility Trends (%) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Policy Target | Current 12/31/2017 | Last Qtr 9/30/2017 | Last Year 12/31/2016 | | | | | |
| Total | n/a | 7.4 | 7.7 | 9.2 | | | | | |
| Benchmark | n/a | 7.0 | 7.2 | 8.7 | | | | | |
| Tracking Error | < 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | | | | | |
| Allocation | < 0.75 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | | | | | |
| Selection | n/a | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | | | | | |



Comments:


Forecast Total Volatility of the PERF decreased by 179 bps over the last year. This change is primarily a reflection of historically low recent market volatility. Recent conditions carry higher weight in risk model calibration.

Rapid shifts in volatility regime can occur and would not be predicted by this model. The best interpretation of this estimate is as an indicator of the plan's volatility given the current market environment.

| Asset Class | | | Total Forecast% ContributionVolatility (%)to Total Vol | | r Value at Risk (\$millions) | | Conditional VaR* (\$millions) | |
|----------------|---------------|-------|--|------|---------------------------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------|
| PUBLIC EQUITY | \$ 176,440 | 10.8% | 71.4% | 0.2% | \$ | 16,961 | \$ | 24,918 |
| PRIVATE EQUITY | \$ 26,710 | 12.7% | 11.6% | 3.3% | \$ | 2,574 | \$ | 3,991 |
| INCOME | \$ 65,583 | 5.4% | 1.7% | 0.3% | \$ | 3,725 | \$ | 5,208 |
| REAL ASSETS | \$ 36,829 | 10.0% | 10.7% | 2.3% | \$ | 3,640 | \$ | 5,172 |
| INFLATION | \$ 27,422 | 7.4% | 4.0% | 0.3% | \$ | 2,471 | \$ | 3,313 |
| LIQUIDITY | \$ 14,660 | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | \$ | (278) | \$ | (273) |
| TLPM | \$ 2,063 | 6.7% | 0.5% | 6.7% | \$ | 93 | \$ | 150 |
| OTHER PERF | \$ 278 | 5.9% | 0.0% | 5.9% | \$ | 9 | \$ | 16 |
| TOTAL FUND | \$ 349,986 | 7.4% | 100.0% | 0.6% | \$ | 19,936 | \$ | 30,769 |


*1-year, 95% confidence Value at Risk. Conditional Value at Risk measures the mean of the tail distribution beyond the 95% confidence level. Both are adjusted to account for 1 year of expected returns of each asset class and the PERF using June 2017 Capital Market Assumptions.

Source: BarraOne / CalPERS



The bottom chart plots the Forecast Total Volatility and Tracking Error for the Total Fund one year prior to each date vs. the Total Volatility and Tracking Error realized for that date. The graph highlights potential deviations between risk model estimates and subsequent realized volatility, due to the lagged and smoothed nature of risk models. In particular, modeled volatility forecasts tend to lag changes in regimes, for example the rapid increase in volatility during the period of the global financial crisis, and similarly the persistent decline in market volatility in the last few years.

Source: BarraOne, SSB, CalPERS



Liquidity Analysis: Total Plan

□1 Week □1 Month □1 Quarter □1 Year ■ Year +

Transactional liquidity is estimated for each asset class /strategy based on the current market environment while also accounting for legal structures or other factors that may impact liquidity. *Source: SSB, CalPERS*


| | As of January 1, 2018 | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------|--|
| | Expected Cash F | lows for 1 Month | |
| | Normal Conditions | Stress Scenario | |
| Cash Equivalents in Liquidity Portfolio (< 30 days)* | \$6,336,098,254 | \$6,336,098,254 | |
| Sources Total (cash flow in) | \$3,709,861,488 | \$3,408,712,219 | |
| Uses Total (cash flow out) | (\$2,090,496,332) | (\$2,090,496,332) | |
| Contingency Use** | | (\$2,546,737,405) | |
| Expected Cash Equivalents (Period End) | \$7,955,463,411 | \$5,107,576,737 | |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 481% | 210% | |

= (a+b)/-(c+d)

* Excludes borrowed liquidity i.e. cash available in asset classes and cash collateral from sec lending ** Contingency Use accounts for potential cash demands from derivatives positions, sec lending, and fund level contingent liabilities

Liquidity Coverage is computed from estimates of future cash inflows and outflows up to a 1 year horizon. In this table, the 1 month forward period is shown with Liquidity Coverage ratios for a normal environment and for a selected stress period (Global Financial Crisis). The Liquidity Coverage ratios could be interpreted as how many times (4.81 times in normal market conditions) available liquid cash /cash equivalents could cover projected cash needs over a 1 month forward period. *Source: BarraOne, SSB, CalPERS*

COUNTERPARTY RISK



CDS spreads are regularly monitored for individual CaIPERS counterparties. In addition, when aggregate spreads rise above 100 bps additional oversight measures are taken.

| <u>Counterparty</u> | <u>NET MTM</u> FORWARDS <u>(\$)</u> | <u>Net MTM</u> OPTIONS (\$) | <u>Net MTM</u> <u>SWAPS</u> <u>(\$)</u> | <u>CaIPERS</u> Exposure <u>(\$)</u> | <u>Counter Party</u> <u>Exposure</u> <u>(\$)</u> | <u>Net MTM</u> <u>Total</u> <u>(\$)</u> | <u>Collateral</u> <u>Posted</u> <u>(\$)*</u> | <u>Net Credit Net</u> <u>Exposure</u> <u>(\$)</u> |
|------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|---|
| Bank of America | (18,227,443) | (54,636) | 14,105,897 | (18,530,179) | 14,353,997 | (4,176,182) | 4,180,000 | 3,818 |
| BNP Paribas | (8,830,000) | | 50,810,811 | (11,992,364) | 53,973,175 | 41,980,811 | (42,025,000) | (44,189) |
| Barclays | (9,499,162) | | | (10,201,047) | 701,885 | (9,499,162) | 9,500,000 | 838 |
| Citigroup | (11,931,747) | (181,299) | 14,192,872 | (12,969,933) | 15,049,759 | 2,079,826 | (2,080,000) | (174) |
| Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce | (110,551) | | 13,430,910 | (110,551) | 13,430,910 | 13,320,359 | (13,330,000) | (9,641) |
| Credit Suisse International | | | 168,044 | | 168,044 | 168,044 | 0 | 168,044 |
| Deutsche Bank | (4,661,685) | (10,883) | 391,336 | (4,830,821) | 549,589 | (4,281,232) | 4,290,000 | 8,768 |
| Goldman Sachs Intl. | (45,023,604) | 114,464,493 | 184,891,137 | (157,171,820) | 411,503,846 | 254,332,026 | (254,350,000) | (17,974) |
| HSBC | 9,208,979 | | 315,319 | (564,858) | 10,089,156 | 9,524,298 | (9,550,000) | (25,702) |
| JPMorgan Chase Bank | (5,100,734) | (35,341) | 107,412,868 | (22,915,459) | 125,192,252 | 102,276,793 | (102,280,000) | (3,207) |
| Morgan Stanley Capital Group | | | 13,947,617 | | 13,947,617 | 13,947,617 | (13,950,000) | (2,383) |
| Morgan Stanley Capital Service | (9,266,916) | (64,876) | 1,988,653 | (12,426,442) | 5,083,303 | (7,343,139) | 7,350,000 | 6,861 |
| RBC Capital Markets | 22,521 | | | | 22,521 | 22,521 | 0 | 22,521 |
| Standard Chartered Bank | (5,029) | | | (5,029) | | (5,029) | 0 | (5,029) |
| Societe Generale | (774,402) | (1,079,700) | 22,603,023 | (8,286,787) | 29,035,708 | 20,748,921 | (20,750,000) | (1,079) |
| State Street | (102,319) | | | (110,854) | 8,535 | (102,319) | 110,000 | 7,681 |
| Toronto Dominion | (3,347,705) | | | (4,040,179) | 692,474 | (3,347,705) | 3,350,000 | 2,295 |
| UBS AGG | (663,397) | | | (990,382) | 326,985 | (663,397) | 700,000 | 36,603 |
| Wells Fargo | | | 12,458,411 | | 12,458,411 | 12,458,411 | (12,460,000) | (1,589) |
| | (108,313,194) | 113,037,758 | 436,716,898 | (265,146,705) | 706,588,167 | 441,441,462 | (441,295,000) | 146,462 |

*As of 12/31 CalPERS posted 471mm to Counterparties which includes Internal and External Collateral

Above: Total market value exposure and net credit exposures are monitored for all of our OTC (over-the-counter) positions.

Source: Blackrock, CalPERS

Below: FCM (Futures Commission Merchant) exposures are monitored for how much margin we have posted with our FCM. *source: CalPERS*

| FUTURES CLEARING MERCHANT EXPOSURE | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Futures Commission Merchant | Collateral Posted | | | | |
| CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC | 160,987,112 | | | | |
| MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH INCORPORATED | 53,662,371 | | | | |

*As of December 31, 2017

Total Fund Leverage Report

as of 12/31/17

Leverage changes a portfolio's risk profile through both impact on liquidity and amplification of returns volatility. As a metric, leverage has the benefit of being relatively straightforward to calculate, making it a good backstop to more nuanced but complex perspectives on risk that could suffer from model errors or flawed assumptions. However, since the leverage metric implicitly treats all assets as equally risky, and because it does not capture the interrelationships between assets (diversification), leverage should always be viewed in conjunction with other perspectives. For example, a low leverage portfolio could easily be more risky than a better-diversified moderate leverage portfolio.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage:

"L1" captures exposures with full recourse to the total plan, and is most relevant from an immediate liquidity perspective. "L2" includes non-recourse borrowing, which can amplify risk and returns for a given \$ invested.

Company Embedded Leverage:

Some Fund assets embed leverage by their nature (i.e., private and public companies). In this case, leverage is not a result of a portfolio management decision, but does contribute to the assets' inherent riskiness. **Unfunded Commitments:**

Represent potential draws on Fund liquidity, but are contingent in nature.

Portfolio View of Plan Leverage

| | | L1: Portfolio | Leverage - | Full Re | course | | | L2: Portfolio | Leverage w/No | n-Recourse |
|---------------------------------|--|---------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Asset Class/ Program | Net Market Value (\$Billions) (A) | + Sources | of Leveraç | ge ¹ | - Cash ² | Gross Market Exposure (B) | Portfolio Leverage (B/A) | Additional + Sources of Leverage | Gross Market Exposure (C) | Portfolio Leverage (C/A) |
| | | Derivatives | Recourse Debt | Other | | | | Non Recourse Debt | | |
| Public Equity | 176.4 | 8.1 | | | 1.8 | 182.8 | 1.04 | | 182.8 | 1.04 |
| Private Equity | 26.7 | | 1.6 ³ | | 0.0 | 28.3 | 1.06 | | 28.3 | 1.06 |
| Income | 65.6 | 4.7 | | | 2.1 | 68.2 | 1.04 | | 68.2 | 1.04 |
| Liquidity | 14.7 | | | | 14.7 | 0.0 | 0.00 | | 0.0 | 0.00 |
| Real Assets | 36.8 | | 0.04 | | 0.6 | 36.2 | 0.98 | 17.6 | 53.8 | 1.46 ⁵ |
| Inflation | 27.4 | 7.1 | | | 6.3 | 28.2 | 1.03 | | 28.2 | 1.03 |
| Securities Lending ⁶ | 0.0 | | | 5.8 | 5.8 | 0.0 | N/M | | 0.0 | N/M |
| Credit Enhancement | 0.0 | | | 0.1 | | 0.1 | N/M | ļ | 0.1 | N/M |
| Other Trust Level ⁷ | 2.3 | | | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 0.55 | | 1.3 | N/M |
| Total Fund | \$350.0 | \$19.9 | \$1.6 | \$6.4 | 32.8 | \$345.1 | 0.99 | \$17.6 | \$362.6 | 1.04 |

Embedded Leverage in Asset Classes

| | Implied Leverage ⁸ |
|----------------|----------------------------------|
| Public Equity | 1.53 |
| Private Equity | 2.22 |
| Real Estate | 1.27 |

Unfunded Commitments

| | Net Market Value (\$B) | Unfunded Commitments (\$B) ⁹ | % of Total Fund |
|----------------|------------------------------|---|-----------------|
| Private Equity | 26.7 | 14.2 | 4.1% |
| Real Assets | 36.8 | 9.2 | 2.6% |

1. FX Forwards used for hedging and fixed income duration shifting are not counted as leverage. Options are included based on delta adjusted notional value.

2. Cash is defined as assets meeting Liquidity program guidelines, and include cash holdings in the Fund.

3. Subscription financing and other liabilities at the fund level (as of Jun 30, 2017) are shown as recourse, while defined non-recourse for policy definition.

4. Recourse Debt in Real Estate is about \$4.5m and it has not changed from the prior quarter.

5. Policy leverage for Real Assets is measured as a Loan-to-Value ratio and will differ from figure shown in table. LTV leverage as of 9/30/17 for Real Estate, Infrastructure and Forestland are: 31%, 43%, and 22%, respectively.


6. Securities lending includes only securities lent for cash collateral (which creates a source of financing).


7. Other Trust Level includes: Absolute Return Strategies and other Plan Level Portfolios.

8. Implied leverage is estimated from either asset class benchmark data or industry research. It represents the Enterprise Value to Equity ratio.

9. Unfunded commitments are as of 12/31/17 for Private Equity and 9/30/17 for Real Assets. 96% of Real Asset unfunded commitments are revocable at CalPERS' discretion.

Source: BarraOne, SSB, Factset, CalPERS







CIO Total Fund Performance and Risk Report

Source: BarraOne, CalPERS

CONCENTRATION REPORT






STRESS TESTING


Historical scenarios highlight the sensitivity of the portfolio to past economic regimes or specific events. The scenarios can be used as a "what if" gauge of current portfolio positioning to understand the potential impact if a similar event or regime were to repeat.

| Scenario | Portf | olio Return | Policy Benchma | rk Return | Excess Retur |
|--|-------|-------------|----------------|-----------|--------------|
| 1973 - 1974 Oil Crisis (Oct 1973 - Mar 1974) | | -3.6% | -3.3% | | -0.3% |
| 2016 Brexit (Jun 2016) | | -3.7% | -3.5% | | -0.2% |
| 2010 Peripheral European Bond Crisis (Mar 2010 - May 2010) | | -5.7% | -5.4% | | -0.3% |
| 2001 Sept 11 (Sep 2001) | | -7.6% | -7.0% | | -0.6% |
| 1998 Russian Financial Crisis (Jul 1998 - Oct 1998) | | -8.2% | -7.2% | | -1.1% |
| 2011 US Debt Ceiling Act (May 2011 - Sep 2011) | | -9.2% | -8.4% | | -0.8% |
| 1987 Market Crash (Aug 1987 to Nov 1987) | | -9.4% | -8.6% | | -0.7% |
| 2007-2008 Equity Slow Grind (Sep 2007 - Aug 2008) | | -9.8% | -8.8% | | -1.0% |
| 2000-2003 Tech Crash & Recession (Jan 2000 - Mar 2003) | | -15.7% | -13.0% | | -2.8% |
| 2008 - 2009 Global Financial Crisis (Sep 2008 - Mar 2009) | V | -30.3% | -28.3% | | -2.0% |



Source: BarraOne, CalPERS

1. How to interpret the OTC Counterparty Risk Exposure section



*Net mark to market (MTM): positions are adjusted to reflect current market values and then summed