CalPERS Trust Level Review Economic and Market Overview

Period Ending December 31, 2017

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> Investment Committee February 12, 2018



Trending ...

Positive	Same Trend	Negative
- (Modest) US GDP growth acceleration	- US leverage	- Tight labor
2.5% during 2017 vs 1.8% in 2016 and 2.0% in 2016	ring 2017 vs 1.8% in 2016 and 2.0% in 2016 8 1/2 years into the expansion, non financial debt is still exactly 250%/GDP	
- Capex actual and intentions	- US housing	- Low personal savings rate
Business investment has accelerated and intentions suggest some forward momentum.	More gradual cycle than past ones - erosion of affordability but still elevated plans to buy.	At < 2.4%, is as low as the late 00s, at a time when valuations are high.
- Hiring and comp intentions	- External imbalances	- Monetary accommodation unwind
Most surveys show very strong plans to hire and to pay higher comp.	US deficit (2+%/GDP faces) surpluses in Japan (4%+), Euro Area (3%+), and China (1%+)	QE unwind might be 'conditional', but we don't know if it can easily be turned back on.
- US corporate earnings and sales	- Chinese growth	- \$ policy dilution and wider trade gap
Very strong 'second wind' for US corporate sector starting mid 2017.	2017 quarters ran 6.9, 6.9,6.8, 6.8	Tariffs and trade deals don't address the savings shortfall that requires US' reliance on foreign capital
- Mining investment		- What tax reform can achieve
As energy prices rebounded, mining investment added 0.3% to GDP during 2017 vs -0.1% during 2016		GOP policies may not deliver what's priced into the stock market/ financial conditions.
-Manufacturing		- Geolopolitical
So far manufacturers have increased use of existing capacity but new plant build may be a future story.		To date markets have blown through geopolitical events = complacency.
- Global trade and PMIs		
Strong upswing since Spring 2016 and now IMF has carried it through its '18 and '19 world projections.		



US business cycle – most indicators still mid to late cycle

Labor Market	Early	Late	%	
Want A Job per Job Offer			99%	
Unemployment Rate			95%	
Jobs Growth 12mo			42%	
KC Fed Labor Market Conditions	-		6%	
Emp/Pop ex aging			70%	
Activity	Early	Late	%	
National Activity Index	│ ─ ■──		23%	
Private Savings Ratio		 _	89%	
Consumer confidence			78%	
Real Personal Disp. Income				
10yr UST vs 3mo LIBOR			56%	
Quarterly	Early	Late	%	
Profit share			19%	
Current Account/GDP			35%	
Leverage YoY				
Net Worth/DI		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Housing affordability			52%	


What to watch:

Labor Force Participation

Productivity



Labor market indicators are mostly later cycle




Few areas still have upside in the jobs market ... outside of wages

One measure of how much is left in the labor market.





Supportive global




Momentum sustained since Spring 2016

Financial leakages from China have stalled



Valuations (high) and leverage (steady)




There are some factors justifying higher valuations

Leverage is unchanged as a multiple of GDP since this expansion began



Tax reform: Will 'success' align with markets?




Markets have moved ahead of the economic outcomes, yet ...

- Corporate behavior typically responds to capacity usage and sales, rather than tax changes.
- **Personal** income tax cuts would be more effective if targeted to households with higher consumption propensity.
 - Worry about distributional impacts b/n States too;
 - Debated impact of past tax changes (60s, 80s, 90s, 00s);
 - Less impactful so far into an economic expansion.

See 'Special Topics' section



Tax Reform: Monetary policy may dampen stimulatory effects





Scenarios


DOWNSIDE (30%)	CENTRAL (45%)	UPSIDE (25%)
"Valuation and policy risks"	"Run Along At Growth Ceiling"	"Positive Synchronicity"
Policy mistakes and vol spike during monetary accommodation unwinds.	Secular factors continue, and there is a low tax package impact on labour force and productivity.	US reforms (surprisingly) unlock more productivity, labor force, hh formation.
Late cycle US stimulus increases inflation, rates and debt servicing.	Growth ceiling means winners and losers.	Global growth acceleration proceeds in spite of stronger currencies.
Risk that 'virtuous' cycle of balance sheet repair and spending unwinds.	Potential for some improvement in low end household formation.	Globally, infrastructure accelerates, tech continues to grow quickly.
US pivot to protectionism threatens global upswing and deficit financing.	Inflation tepid in spite of late cycle labor market.	Recent signs of bottoming in emerging markets morph into a virtuous cycle.
	Well signaled (and flexible) removal of stimulus here and abroad.	



Impact of US Tax Reform: Advertised benefits not guaranteed



US <u>corporate tax</u> – incremental investment and hiring determined by the effective rate




Source: Tax Foundation "Corporate Income Tax Rates around the World, September 2017


Corporate tax rates in G20 Countries								
Top Sta	tutory	Average Effective			Average		ive	
US	39.1	Argentina	37.3	Argentina	22.6			
Japan	37.0	Indonesia	36.4	US	18.6			
Argentina	35.0	US	29.0	Japan	18.0			
S.Africa	34.6	Japan	27.9	Brazil	17.0			
Brazil	34.0	Italy	26.8	UK	15.7			
India	32.5	India	25.6	Germany	15.5			
Italy	31.4	S.Africa	23.5	India	15.0			
Germany	30.2	Brazil	22.3	Mexico	11.9			
Australia	30.0	Russia	21.3	Indonesia	11.8			
Mexico	30.0	S.Korea	20.4	France	11.2			
France	29.7 🗸	Mexico	20.3 🗸	Australia	10.4			
Canada	26.1	France	20.0	China	10.0			
China	25.0	Turkey	19.5	Canada	8.5			
Indonesia	25.0	China	19.1	Saudi	8.4			
S.Korea	24.2	Australia	17.0	S.Africa	6.2			
UK	24.0	Canada	16.2	Turkey	5.1			
Russia	20.0	Germany	14.5	Russia	4.4			
Saudi	20.0	UK	10.1	S.Korea	4.1			
Turkey	20.0			Italy	-23.5			

Source: CBO "International Comparisons of Corporate Income Tax Rates", March 2017




US corporate tax – macro already favorable for hiring and investment











US personal income tax - no agreement on counterfactuals





US personal income tax – factors that reduce impact




Savings ratio is already low

It's older (and wealthier) persons are already feeling most confident



Households: Inequality constraints have slowed recovery





"Deterioration in the ability of households to borrow appears to not have recovered as of 2012, thus possibly contributing to the slow recovery that we have observed."


Source: Chicago Fed Letter: "Inequality and recessions", January 2018



Households: Skew toward wealthier families still growing







Relative gains by high end cohorts continued through 2016 survey



Employee Comp Share of GDP near lows.




Item 6b, Attachment 1, Page 17 of 35

Appendix: Additional Charts




US activity has picked up from the wobbles of '14-'16






For jobs market, sourcing workers is an issue ...










... more so with the requisite skills




Savings ratio is already low

In last cycle, this level of openings would have resulted in much lower u-rate already







Finding suitable labor is the key issue for small businesses



Loan availability is fine ... good worker availability is not.








Consumer – very strong finish to last year


Consumer	/r to	Dec qtr	
	Dec'16 Dec'17		(saar)
Goods	3.7%	5.0%	10.3%
Autos	9.7%	2.4%	18.2%
Household	2.2%	6.9%	11.1%
TVs etc	-2.1%	3.6%	7.2%
Computers etc	6.3%	10.4%	14.5%
Sporting	-5.0%	4.8%	3.1%
Fuel	9.5%	6.7%	50.8%
Groceries	1.6%	4.5%	7.5%
Services	5.1%	4.4%	4.9%
Healthcare	5.7%	4.0%	5.1%
Housing	5.0%	4.6%	4.6%
Rest, hotels	2.4%	4.2%	4.1%
Financial	6.7%	10.0%	10.4%
Cell phone	2.8%	0.3%	5.4%
Air travel	5.0%	-0.8%	-2.2%
PCE	4.7%	4.6%	6.7%




Business capex - improving



Steady upswing predated GOP ascension








To date, upswing in manufacturing is in capacity utilization, not new capacity



Housing – affordability normalizes but plans to buy rocketing












Housing – further upside despite demographic headwinds



Overall household formation growth has been low during this expansion



Owner households only starting to awaken



Strong completions responding to fast rents growth



Foreign Trade – a risk

	US Balance of Trade in Goods and Services with:									
\$bn	Total	Canada	Mexico	Japan	Korea	China	Germany	UK	Other EU	OPEC
2001	-362	-48	-26	-55	-12	-81	-31	2	-29	-34
2002	-419	-44	-33	-57	-12	-102	-40	-2	-32	-31
2003	-494	-47	-37	-54	-12	-123	-43	-4	-39	-50
2004	-610	-61	-42	-61	-18	-162	-50	-1	-45	-70
2005	-714	-72	-45	-67	-13	-201	-54	-2	-52	-90
2006	-762	-61	-59	-76	-10	-234	-55	2	-52	-100
2007	-705	-53	-69	-72	-9	-257	-51	11	-40	-119
2008	-709	-61	-59	-60	-7	-263	-50	9	-18	-169
2009	-384	-3	-42	-28	-5	-220	-32	10	-1	-52
2010	-495	-6	-58	-43	-4	-261	-38	9	-16	-86
2011	-549	-11	-57	-45	-5	-279	-53	15	-20	-113
2012	-537	-5	-54	-58	-8	-295	-66	12	-23	-83
2013	-462	-4	-47	-59	-9	-295	-73	5	-16	-49
2014	-490	-11	-51	-54	-15	-315	-80	11	-25	-29
2015	-500	4	-58	-55	-19	-334	-77	12	-37	30
2016	-505	8	-63	-57	-18	-309	-67	15	-41	18
2017*	-552	3	-70	-56	-11	-331	-69	14	-44	9
* three o	* three quarters at an annual rate									

Trade deals or tariffs unlikely to narrow the US trade deficit



In underlying terms the US trade gap is getting wider ... and a drag on growth



Ultimately it reflects the savingsinvestment gap nationally



Global - IMF raises World outlook

Table 1. Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections

(Percent change unless noted otherwise)


	-		Year	over Year		
	E	Estimate	Projecti	ons	Difference from 2017 WEO Proj	
	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018	2019
World Output	3.2	3.7	3.9	3.9	0.2	0.2
Advanced Economies	1.7	2.3	23	2.2	0.3	0.4
United States	1.5	2.3	2.7	2.5	0.4	0.6
Euro Area	1.8	2.4	2.2	2.0	0.3	0.3
Germany	1.9	2.5	2.3	2.0	0.5	0.5
France	1.2	1.8	1.9	1.9	0.1	0.0
Italy	0.9	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.3	0.2
Spain	3.3	3.1	2.4	2.1	-0.1	0.1
Japan	0.9	1.8	1.2	0.9	0.5	0.1
United Kingdom	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.5	0.0	-0.1
Canada	1.4	3.0	2.3	2.0	0.2	0.3
Other Advanced Economies 3/	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.6	0.1	0.1
Emerging Market and Developing Economies	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.0	0.0	0.0
Commonwealth of Independent States	0.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	0.1	0.0
Russia	-0.2	1.8	1.7	1.5	0.1	0.0
Excluding Russia	1.9	3.1	3.4	3.5	0.1	0.0
Emerging and Developing Asia	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.6	0.0	0.1
China	6.7	6.8	6.6	6.4	0.1	0.1
India 4/	7.1	6.7	7.4	7.8	0.0	0.0
ASEAN-5 5/	4.9	5.3	5.3	5.3	0.1	0.0
Emerging and Developing Europe	3.2	5.2	4.0	3.8	0.5	0.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	-0.7	1.3	1.9	2.6	0.0	0.2
Brazil	-3.5	1.1	1.9	2.1	0.4	0.1
Mexico	2.9	2.0	2.3	3.0	0.4	0.7
Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan	4.9	2.5	3.6	3.5	0.1	0.0
Saudi Arabia	1.7	-0.7	1.6	2.2	0.5	0.6
2425252 0.0022						

Latest revision (1/18 vs 10/17) reflects increased global growth momentum and the expected impact of the recently approved U.S. tax policy changes.


"On the downside (risks), rich asset valuations and very compressed term premiums raise the possibility of a financial market correction, which could dampen growth and confidence ... a possible trigger is a fasterthan-expected increase in advanced economy core inflation.



... but there are risks



Falls in volatility and increases in global economic and asset price movements potentially create risk



Source: Bloomberg, Haver, UBS


Historically, increases in yields impact other asset classes if they move too far, too fast




China – stable for now




Successful soft landing



Higher inflation has produced some tightening




Real GDP stable, PMI stronger



External surplus back to pre super-cycle rate



Base effects have slowed industrial growth




Reserves rebuild helped by softer dollar




Investment Office Global Fixed Income


Japan – central bank will keep policy easy into 2019-20




GDP growth has risen above potential




Inflation response has to date been tepid ...




Leading indicators have improved



although headline boosted buy fresh food




Strong growth in female participation/ jobs



Core rate unlikely to approach 2%



Euro Area - growth momentum continues





Euro Area – risks remain

Spain


- Pro-secessionists won with a slim majority. Catalan Parliament proposes Puigdemont as Catalan President.
 - Puigdemont is in exile in Belgium;
 - Any candidate is required to physically and personally address the Parliament;
 - The Spanish central government has indicated immediate incarceration upon his return
- · Near term mild underperformance due to headline risk.


Italy

- Election date finalized: March 4
- Untested new electoral system
- Current polls suggest it will be a tight race between M5S and center-right coalition;
- A center-right win will smooth out some extremism but unlikely to take any necessary reforms and may be more fiscally liberal.
- Risk to Italy yield underperformance.

Germany coalition government negotiations


- Formal talks are underway between CDU and SPD
- Little risk as party differences are not substantial from a markets' perspective
- · Current government remains in place until a new one is appointed
- Until (or if) new elections are called, risk to market is low.







UK - doing better than expected




Very tight labor market

Spending is slowing but remains stronger than expected by Bank of England



UK Brexit – shaping up something similar to Norwegian model

Chart 1 The EU's Brexit timeline



* Strong QMV = 72% of the 27 Member States, i.e. 20 Member States representing 65 % of the EU 27 population.

Little time to negotiation a trade deal.

EU putting on pressure to put current agreement s (nontrade) into UK legislation.


Source: EU Commission

The end position is looking clearer if negotiations continue - Norwegian-type model


- UK agreed no physical border within Ireland Implies no border between mainland Ireland (EU) and the UK;
- UK wants full access to Single market but control over immigration;
- EU wants to retain freedoms for citizens.



US dollar – no guarantee of strength



US deficits can be difficult to fund during an expansion



... especially if twin deficits are rising

