Rick	Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 1 of 37		
1 2 3 4 5	 LAW OFFICES OF JOHN MICHAEL JENSEN 11500 West Olympic Blvd Suite 550 Los Angeles CA 90064 (310) 312-1100 Attorneys for Respondent Richard Lewis 		
6			
7	BEFORE THE BOARD	OF ADMINISTRATION	
8	CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLO	DYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM	
9			
10			
11	In the Matter of the Appeal of CalPERS'	CALPERS CASE NO.: 2014 0256	
12	Denial of Pension Benefits to Richard Lewis	OAH CASE NO.: 2014040945	
13	RICHARD LEWIS and CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO,	RICHARD LEWIS' NOTICE AND MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL	
14 15	Respondents.	ESTOPPEL/ <i>RES JUDICATA</i> CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING;	
16		MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF JOHN MICHAEL JENSEN IN SUPPORT	
17		HEARING: October 13 and 14, 2014	
18 19		LOCATION: CalPERS Regional Office 650 E. Hospitality Ln, Ste. 330	
20		San Bernardino, CA 92408	
21			
22	TO THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EM	IPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, AND	
23	THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF	CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'	
24	RETIREMENT SYSTEM ("CALPERS") A	ND TO ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:	
25	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on, 2014 at:00m. or as soon thereafter		
26	as counsel may be heard, before the Office of Administrative Hearings, San Diego Division,		
27	located at 1350 Front Street, Suite 3005, San Di	ego, CA 92101, respondent Richard Lewis will	
28	and hereby does move the Presiding Administra	tive Law Judge and/or the Office of	
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	RICHARD LEWIS' MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/ <i>RES JUDICATA</i> CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING		

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Administrative Hearings for a ruling that Lewis' collateral estoppel/*res judicata* claims shall be
 heard at the outset of the administrative proceedings on October 13 and 14, 2014, prior to the
 commencement of the portion of the hearing focusing on CalPERS' disallowance of Lewis'
 highest compensation and Employer Paid Member Contributions ("EPMC") reported by the City
 of San Bernardino to CalPERS.

The collateral estoppel/res judicata issues are threshold questions. If Lewis prevails on
those claims, no hearing on CalPERS reduction may go forward, and the OAH should then issue
a Proposed Decision granting the collateral estoppel/res judicata claims and finding that
CalPERS is barred from proceeding with the hearing on its reduction of Lewis' pension
allowance, and <u>must recommence paying the higher pension, and all other remedies (such as</u>
<u>back payments or interest) in accord with a determination that Mr. Lewis is entitled to the</u>
higher pension.

This motion is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the
 Declaration of John Michael Jensen in support, the files and records herein, and upon such oral
 argument and additional pleadings as may be taken by the Court at the hearing on this matter.
 Respectfully submitted,

Dated: October 3, 2014

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John Michael Jensen, Attorney for Respondent Richard Lewis

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>Introduction</u>

Collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to bar re-litigation of this matter. CalPERS
previously made a binding determination on the same facts and law that CalPERS seeks again to
re-litigate in this case.

After the city provided the factual and legal documents to CalPERS, CalPERS explicitly
reviewed, considered, and made a binding determination that Lewis was entitled to a pension
based on the salary of the Battalion Chief.

In furtherance of that determination, CalPERS instructed the City to (a) report all of Mr. 9 Lewis' approximately three years of back wages to CalPERS and make the necessary employer 10 and employee contributions associated with that, (b) to then continue reporting his base salary (at 11 the Battalion Chief pay scale) and EPMC special compensation to CalPERS going forward, (c) 12 to make all necessary employer and employee contributions associated with the reported 13 compensation, and (d) to report all of this as temporary upgrade pay. The City diligently and 14 faithfully followed CalPERS' instructions all the way through Mr. Lewis' retirement in 15 November 2012. 16

The documents, issues, facts, and law in this administrative matter were the same
documents issues facts and law that were previously received, considered, and determined by
CalPERS. CalPERS already determined these issues, facts, and law in Lewis' favor.

Under Government Code 20099 and the regulations adopted by CalPERS, CalPERS staff
has the right and ability to make final determinations, as they did previously in this matter.

22 II. Factual Background

Respondent Richard Lewis was a career firefighter with the San Bernardino Fire Department ("SBFD"), spending three decades of his life as an active firefighter. He was first employed in March 1981 and ultimately retired after he was determined disabled as a result of both on-the-job injuries and ultimately a diagnosis of cancer that was presumptively deemed to have been caused by his exposure to carcinogenic substances he was exposed to in the course of his firefighting duties.

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Eight years before his retirement, Mr. Lewis was wrongly passed over for promotion to 1 the position of Battalion Chief, the highest rank in the SBFD other than the Chief. This was 2 despite the fact that Mr. Lewis had received the highest test scores of all the individuals on the 3 promotion list and that long-standing City policies and procedures mandated that he should have 4 been selected for the position. Several years later the City reached a settlement of a lawsuit 5 brought by Lewis by which he would technically remain in the position of Fire Captain, but he 6 would receive all of the compensation and other benefits of the Battalion Chief position, 7 including the right to have his base salary and Employer Paid Member Contributions ("EPMC") 8 special compensation used to calculate his ultimate pension allowance. 9

The City dutifully communicated with CalPERS to find out how to report both Mr. Lewis' back wages (back to the time he was wrongly passed over for the Battalion Chief position) and his compensation going forward in order to ensure he would receive CalPERS pension benefits based on those earnings. The City also sent CalPERS a copy of the City's settlement agreement with Mr. Lewis which fully disclosed the settlement terms.

After review of the materials and information provided to CalPERS by the City, 15 CalPERS explicitly instructed the City to (a) report all of Mr. Lewis' approximately three years 16 of back wages to CalPERS and make the necessary employer and employee contributions 17 18 associated with that, (b) to then continue reporting his base salary (at the Battalion Chief pay scale) and EPMC special compensation to CalPERS going forward, (c) to make all necessary 19 employer and employee contributions associated with the reported compensation, and (d) to 20 report all of this as temporary upgrade pay. The City diligently and faithfully followed CalPERS' 21 instructions all the way through Mr. Lewis' retirement in November 2012. 22

Six months <u>after</u> Mr. Lewis retired, and nearly six years after CalPERS instructed the
City on how to report Mr. Lewis' compensation on an ongoing basis, CalPERS suddenly and
without warning sent letters to Mr. Lewis and the City advising that CalPERS had changed its
position and was now disallowing the additional compensation attributable to the Battalion Chief
position as well as the EPMC, drastically reducing Mr. Lewis' pension allowance by nearly thirty
percent (30%).

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Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata Bar CalPERS' Action and This Proceeding III.

CalPERS is largely seeking to re-litigate a dispute that it was already aware of and privity 2 to as administrator of the City's pension benefits. CalPERS is seeking to re-litigate and to assert jurisdiction over a civil service and discrimination dispute that it previously accepted. Now, after the fact, CalPERS tries to deny Mr. Lewis the benefits of the resolution of the dispute between the parties that CalPERS previously approved.

Specifically, received information from the City and Mr. Lewis about the nature of the 7 dispute and its resolution including the settlement agreement between Mr. Lewis and the City. 8 (Exhibit 1.) Through its "compensation review unit", CalPERS explicitly weighed evidence and 9 made determinations of law. Although a formal Administrative Procedures Act ("APA", 10 Government Code, §§11340, et seq.) hearing was available to CalPERS, CalPERS chose not to 11 make an adversarial record. Instead, CalPERS issued its letter to the City instructing it to report 12 Mr. Lewis' Battalion Chief compensation as "temporary upgrade pay" special compensation on 13 July 5, 2007. (Exhibit 2.) As indicated in the letter, CalPERS did so based on its full 14 understanding of the terms of the settlement agreement between Mr. Lewis and the City. 15

(Exhibit 1.) 16

IV. **Procedural Background** 17

Mr. Lewis filed a Jurisdictional Challenge on July 8, 2014 which included his claim that 18 the administrative process is barred at the threshold by collateral estoppel/res judicata. CalPERS 19 filed an Opposition on May 28, 2014. Acting Presiding Administrative Law Judge Beth Faber 20 Jacobs issued a ruling on July 13, 2014, that denied the Jurisdictional Challenge to the extent it 21 sought to dismiss the Statement of Issues and indicated that the OAH lacks the authority to do so, 22 but (1) ruled that the denial was without prejudice, (2) found that resolution of the issues in the 23 Jurisdictional Challenge required an evidentiary hearing, and (3) ruled that these issues can be 24 appropriately addressed in the administrative hearing and that Mr.Lewis can present his claims 25 during the hearing. 26

Mr. Lewis will act in accordance with the Court's order and present his claims during the 27 hearing. With due respect for the Court's ruling, however, he requests that the collateral 28

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	optonnol/wag indicate claim ha taken up as the first matter in the hearing have a first of the last		
1	estoppel/ <i>res judicata</i> claim be taken up as the first matter in the hearing because of its threshold nature.		
2	LAW AND ARGUMENT		
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4	I. <u>Collateral Estoppel and <i>Res Judicata</i> Generally</u>		
5	The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, [fn. omitted] is firmly		
6	embedded in both federal and California common law. It is grounded on the premise that "once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no		
7	further fact-finding function to be performed." [Citation omitted.]		
8	(Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., (2010) 50 Cal.4 th 860, 864.)		
9	Further, these doctrines apply not simply to decisions in courts of law, but under		
10	appropriate conditions to decisions of administrative agencies as well.		
11	We have long favored application of the common-law doctrines of collateral		
12	estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality. "When an administrative agency		
13	is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before		
14	it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply <i>res judicata</i> to enforce repose." [Citation omitted.]		
15	(Astoria Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino (1991) 501 U.S. 104, 107.)		
16	[R]espect for the administrative decisionmaking process requires that the		
17	prospective plaintiff continue that process to completion, including exhausting any available judicial avenues for reversal of adverse findings. [Citation omitted.]		
18	Failure to do so will result in any quasijudicial administrative finds achieving		
19	binding, preclusive effect and may bar further relief on the same claims. [Citation omitted.].		
20	(McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4 th 88, 113.)		
21	The litigation of issues that could and should have been pursued in a prior proceeding		
22	action is also barred. (Takahashi v. Board of Regents (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464.) Unreviewed		
23	findings of a state administrative agency are entitled to preclusive effect. (Brand v. Regents of		
24	Univ. of California (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1349.) An administrative adjudicatory decision		
25	which has not been overturned through the courts is absolutely immune from collateral attack.		
26	(Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Mundo (1951) 37 Cal.2d 1.)		
27	II. <u>CalPERS' Authority to Make Decision; Discretionary Administrative Hearing</u>		
28	Process		
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Prior to the determination in July 2007 (**Exhibit 2**), the CalPERS Board, or the Executive Officer acting on the Board's behalf, authorized CalPERS' staff to make final determinations that were sufficient to support collateral estoppel and *res judicata*. (*Government* Code, §§20099, 20123.) A formal OAH hearing is optional.¹

CalPERS and its Board are an administrative agency of limited jurisdiction.
Administrative agencies "have only such powers as have been conferred on them, expressly or
by implication, by constitution or statute." (*Ferdig v. State Personnel Bd.* (1969) 71 Cal.2d 96,
103; United States F. & G. Co. v. Superior Court (1931) 214 Cal. 468, 471.)

Mr. Lewis recognizes that under the APA, neither the OAH nor the ALJ has authority or
power to stop a proceeding or order the agency to do anything. Specifically, the APA does not
provide the OAH and ALJ with any authority or power (1) to preclude re-litigation of already
decided matters, (2) to merge a cause into a judgment or a prior final decision of the agency, or
(3) to otherwise meaningfully allow an individual to assert defenses of collateral estoppel and *res judicata.*² This was the import of Judge Jacobs' ruling on June 13, 2014.

But more importantly, Mr. Lewis urges the Court to recognize that CalPERS has no
inherent authority to reconsider a final administrative decision. (*Heap v. City of Los Angeles*(1936) 6 Cal.2d 405, 407; Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agri. etc. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 204,
209; Gutierrez v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Ass'n (1998)
62 Cal.App.4th 745, 749, fn. 3.)

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 [&]quot;The board may, *in its discretion*, hold a hearing for the purpose of determining any question presented to in involving any right, benefit, or obligation of a person under this part."
 (Government Code, §20134, emphasis added.) "The Executive Officer is hereby authorized ... to fix and authorize the payment of any refund, allowance or benefit to which such applicant may be found to be entitled.... The Executive Officer *may refer* the question of an applicant's entitlement to any refund, allowance or benefit ... to a hearing officer for hearing." (*California Code of Regulations*, §555, emphasis added.)

 ² The APA only empowers the ALJ to conduct a hearing based on the limited issues. The APA requires the ALJ (1) to hear the litigation in full, (2) to write a *Proposed Decision*, and (3) to send that "non-binding" *Proposed Decision* to the agency for the agency's approval or rejection. (*Ibid.*) CalPERS cites no law or process that would allow an individual in the administrative process to bar or preclude an agency from undertaking a second administrative process on the same law and facts.

1 The general rule is that, "[u]nless authorized by statute, an administrative agency acting in an adjudicatory capacity ... may not in any event reconsider or reopen a decision. [Citations 2 omitted.]" (Gutierrez v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Ass'n 3 (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 745, 749, fn. 3.) 4

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B.

CalPERS Has No Statutory Authority to Reopen Cases

The Public Employees' Retirement Law ("PERL", §§20000, et seq.) does not provide 6 CalPERS with specific authority to reopen a case. Specifically in this case, the PERL does not 7 contain any statute that would allow CalPERS to reopen the case,³ such as Vehicle Code section 8 13353.2(e) or Unemployment Insurance Code section 1960. 9

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CalPERS' Continuing Oversight to Correct Errors is Not Specific Statutory Authority to Reopen the Case

CalPERS proposes that the statutes enabling the correction of errors and omission allows 12 a second process. (See §§20160 and 20164.) However, those statutes are not specific or sufficient 13 authority for reopening cases or overcoming preclusion. 14

This issue has been litigated before. The County Employees Retirement Law or "CERL" 15 (§§31450, et seq.) has a statute governing corrections of errors and omission similar to Sections 16 20160 and 20164 in the PERL, stating that "[t]he board may, in its discretion and upon any terms 17 it deems just, correct the errors or omissions of any active or retired member, or any beneficiary 18 of an active or retired member, if all of the following facts exist." (§31541.) The Appellate Court 19 ruled in a very similar case involving the Los Angeles County Employees' Retirement 20 Association ("LACERA"), that LACERA had no statutory authority (including in its errors and 21 omissions statutes) that allowed it to reopen prior decisions: 22

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Unless authorized by statute, an administrative agency acting in an adjudicatory capacity (as LACERA does when it decides whether to grant disability retirement benefits) may not in any event reconsider or reopen a decision.

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³ While a few statutes allow CalPERS in limited instances to reconsider its prior 27 disability decisions, CalPERS has no statutory authority to reopen its prior final determinations like the determination in Mr. Lewis' favor in July 2007. 28

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1	(Gutierrez v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Ass'n, supra, at 749, fn. 3, citing Heap v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at 407, and Olive Proration etc. Com. v. Agri. etc. Com., supra, at 209.)
2	Yet in this case, CalPERS relies on the errors and omissions language in <i>Government</i>
3	<i>Code</i> section 20160(b) as its authority to reopen cases. ⁴ Under <i>Gutierrez</i> , Sections 20160 and
4	20164 fail to provide authority to reopen resolved matters.
5	C. Statutes in PERL Allow Reopening of Specific Matters
6	Several statutes in the PERL authorize CalPERS to reopen matters in narrow cases. The
7	existence of this specific and limited authority to reopen specific matters demonstrates that
-	CalPERS does not have greater generalized authority to avoid preclusion. The Legislature would
9	not authorize reconsideration of the more limited cases if the Legislature had already granted
10	CalPERS the broader authority to reopen <i>all</i> cases.
11	For example, the PERL allows CalPERS through the Workers Compensation Appeals
12	Board to reopen disability determinations within 5 years:
13	The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board shall have continuing jurisdiction
14	over its determinations made under Section 21166 and may at any time within five years of the date of injury, upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is
16 17	given to the parties in interest, rescind, alter, or amend the determination, good cause appearing therefor. (§21171.)
18	CalPERS also has the ability to alter benefits in other limited circumstances.
19 20	If, prior to attaining the minimum age for voluntary retirement for service applicable to members of his or her class, a recipient of a disability retirement allowance, other than one for industrial disability, engages in a gainful occupation
21	not in state service, the board shall reduce his or her monthly disability retirement
22	pension When he or she reaches the minimum age for voluntary retirement for service applicable to members of his or her class his or her retirement allowance
23	shall be made equal to the amount it would be if not reduced under this section, and shall not again be modified for any cause.
24	(§21432.)
25	As another "disability" example, Government Code section 19871.2 reads: "The
26	appointing authority may periodically review the employee's condition by any means necessary
27 28	⁴ Section 20160 reads, "The Board shall correct all actions taken as a result of errors or omissions of the university, any contracting agency, any state agency or department, or this system." (§20160.)
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	RICHARD LEWIS' MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/ <i>RES JUDICATA</i> CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING

1 || to determine an employee's continued eligibility for enhanced benefits."

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III. Public Interest Exception and Changing Legal Interpretation Do Not Negate Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata

CalPERS has in the past asserted that the public interest exception should exempt
CalPERS from collateral estoppel and *res judicata*. But "[t]he public interest exception is an
extremely narrow one; we emphasize that it is the exception, not the rule, and is only to be
applied in exceptional circumstances. (*Housing Authority v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1086.)
But when the issue is a question of law rather than of fact, the prior determination is not conclusive either if injustice would result or if the public interest requires

- that re-litigation not be foreclosed. [Citations omitted.] (City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 64.)
- (Cuy of Sucramenico V. Sidie of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 64.)
- Regarding the "public interest" exception, the *City of Sacramento* court found that it
- applies only when "the consequences of any error transcend those which would apply to mere
 private parties." (*Ibid.*)
- In this case, no other parties suffer consequences. The underlying issue in this case is one person's pension benefit which was fully funded at the time of his retirement. There is no general public interest in one person's fully funded retirement benefit. There is no injustice in CalPERS paying a benefit that was fully funded by the State under Judge Naughton's salary at the time of
- 19 retirement. The *City of Sacramento* case finds:
 - Of course, res judicata and the rule of final judgments bar us from disturbing individual claims or causes of action, on behalf of specific agencies, which have been finally adjudicated and are no longer subject to review. [Citations omitted.] (*Id.*, at 65.)
 - CalPERS' idea that changing legal interpretations are sufficient to negate collateral estoppel and *res judicata* is also without merit. As laws and interpretations change all the time, CalPERS' idea that it can reopen litigated cases *without specific authority to do so* simply
- because it has changed its interpretation is without legal support. It also effectively means no
 - decision is ever resolved and, contrary to law, collateral estoppel does not apply to CalPERS.
 - IV. <u>Application of Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata</u>

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CalPERS is barred at the threshold from proceeding with a second administrative 1 process on the same matters that it previously determined. 2

A. **CalPERS'** Determination

In the summer of 2007, Carlous Johnson of CalPERS made a determination that Mr. 4 Lewis' additional pay at the Battalion Chief level should be included in the compensation 5 reported to CalPERS for purposes of pension benefit accrual. Mr. Johnson then explicitly 6 instructed the City on July 5, 2007 to report additional compensation to CalPERS as "temporary 7 8 upgrade pay" special compensation. (Exhibit 2.)

There is no question that CalPERS obtained a copy of the settlement agreement between 9 Mr. Lewis and the City; that CalPERS reviewed the terms of the agreement and other 10 information it received from the City; and that CalPERS made a determination that the City 11 should report Mr. Lewis' additional pay for at the Battalion Chief position level as "temporary 12 upgrade pay" special compensation. (Exhibits 1 and 2.) CalPERS was fully informed that Mr. 13 Lewis would be receiving the increased pay attributable to the Battalion Chief position on an 14 ongoing basis, yet saw no reason to object at the time or throughout the next five years of Mr. 15 Lewis' employment that the pay was not "temporary" as CalPERS now contends. 16

Further, no new facts or law have developed since CalPERS' decision. Indeed, there 17 could be no factual situation because (a) Mr. Lewis received the Battalion Chief pay from the 18 time of the settlement agreement until his retirement from the SBFD, (b) the City reported all of 19 that increased compensation as "special upgrade pay" pursuant to CalPERS' instructions 20 throughout the remainder of Mr. Lewis' employment until he retired from the SBFD, and (c) 21 CalPERS issued its letter disallowing the "special upgrade pay" reporting after Mr. Lewis retired, 22 so by definition there could have been no change in his employment status or the way his 23 compensation was reported to and treated by CalPERS. 24

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Collateral Estoppel Applies to Agencies and CalPERS in This Matter B.

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Collateral estoppel/res judicata applies to agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.

An administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity when it resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it and provides the parties with an opportunity to present evidence and to litigate fully the issues. (United States v. Utah Constr. -9-

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1	Co., supra, 384 U.S. at p. 422 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 660-661].) (Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d. 1171, 1178-1179.)		
2	Collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to agencies. An administrative order		
3	determining facts within its jurisdiction, and relating to individual rights, will often be held		
4	binding in a subsequent proceeding before the agency itself, where the statute does not expressly		
5	give the agency power to modify its decisions. (Olive Proration Program Committee for Olive		
6	Proration Zone No. 1 v. Agricultural Prorate Com. (1941) 17 C.2d 204, 209, 109 P.2d 918;		
7	Louis Stores v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1962) 57 C.2d 749, 756, 22 C.R. 14,		
8	371 P.2d 758, see People v. Sims (1982) 32 C.3d 468, 186 C.R. 77, 651 P.2d 321.		
9	C. <u>General Rule: Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata Apply to Agencies</u>		
10	Except When There is Statutory Authority to Reopen Cases		
11	Res judicata (and collateral estoppel) principles applies except where the		
12	Legislature has specified exactly what preclusive effect a judicial determination		
13	has on a related administrative proceeding. (<i>Gikas v. Zolin</i> (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 851–852, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745 [traditional collateral estoppe]		
14	principles did not govern where Legislature had specified in Vehicle Code exactly what preclusive effect criminal proceeding had on administrative license		
15	suspension for drunk driving]; see Branson, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 345, 29		
16	Cal.Rptr.2d 314.) (Le Parc Community Ass'n v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. (2003) 110		
17	Cal.App.4 th 1161, 1170.)		
18	CalPERS has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction re collateral estoppel and		
19	res judictata. The doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is probably inapplicable to an		
20 21	administrative agency's determinations of its own jurisdiction. ⁵ (See San Francisco v. Padilla		
21	(1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 388, 400.)		
22	D. <u>Final Determination</u>		
24	CalPERS' prior administrative determination met the threshold requirements of a final		
25			
26	⁵ Although Mr. Lewis has disputed the scope and nature of CalPERS' authority in this and other pending actions or papers, CalPERS asserts that it is authorized by the PERL and the		
27	California Constitution to determine the right to and amount of benefits payable to Members,		
28	including Mr. Lewis, and to initiate administrative processes to make those determinations, by itself, by its Board, and by delegation, including to the OAH under the APA, and to hold		
	hearings, if necessary to make those determinations. - 10 –		
	CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING		
	RICHARD LEWIS' MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/RES JUDICATA CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING		

1 decision:

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2	'First, the issue sought to be precluded from re-litigation must be identical to	
3	that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in	
4	the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be	
5	the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The	
6	party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.' [Citation.]" If all of these threshold requirements of collateral	
7	estoppel are met, the analysis determining whether that doctrine applies to give	
8	preclusive effect then looks to " 'the public policies underlying the doctrine before concluding that [it] should be applied in a particular setting.' [Citation.]"	
9	(Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4 th 339, 356-357, quoting Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources	
10	Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 943-944.)	
11	E. <u>Applying the Threshold Requirements of Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata</u>	
12	Doctrine	
13	This controversy meets all five threshold requirements:	
14	1) <u>Identical to issue litigated in former process</u> . CalPERS asserts the same	
15	issues in 2013 as it asserted in 2007: whether and how Mr. Lewis' increased	
16	compensation at the Battalion Chief level should be reported to CalPERS and considered	
17	in the calculation of his pension allowance.	
18	2) <u>Issue must have had opportunity to be litigated</u> . In 2007, CalPERS'	
19	staff interpreted the law to facts and made a quasi-judicial determination in Mr. Lewis'	
20	favor by ruling on law as applied to facts.	
21	Sims explained that "[a]n issue is actually litigated '[w]hen [it] is properly raised,	
22	by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is <i>determined</i> A determination may be based on a <i>failure of proof</i> ' (Rest.2d,	
23	Judgments (1982) § 27, com. d, p. 255, italics added.) (<i>Sims, supra</i> , 32 Cal.3d at p. 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.)	
24	(<i>Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.</i> (2010) 50 Cal.4 th 860, 871.)	
25	In Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court found that the	
26	Department of Labor's administrative process met the "actual litigation" requirement even	
27	though plaintiff (Murray) had <u>no</u> opportunity to participate in a contested process up to	
28	that point.	
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1	3) Issue necessarily raised in former process. The issues raised now were		
2	either decided and/or had to be raised for decision by CalPERS in 2007.		
3	CalPERS cannot "reserve" the right to reopen a certain cause of action based on		
4	the same underlying core nucleus of facts about positions and pay. ⁶		
5	4) <u>Determination is Final</u> . CalPERS is not required by statute to make every		
6	binding quasi-judicial decision in any particular way, but its staff is empowered to make		
7	binding final decision. (Government Code, §20099.)		
8	5) Same party as in former process or one in privity. Both parties—		
9	CalPERS and Mr. Lewis (and if necessary the City)—are identical in 2007 and currently.		
10	Collateral estoppel/res judicata applies to the administrative process and CalPERS in this		
11	matter:		
12	An administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity when it resolves disputed		
13	issues of fact properly before it and provides the parties with an opportunity to		
14	present evidence and to litigate fully the issues. (United States v. Utah Constr. Co., supra, 384 U.S. at p. 422 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 660-661].)		
15	(Rymer v. Hagler (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d. 1171, 1178-1179.)		
16	CONCLUSION		
17	Mr. Lewis understands that he will be required to persuade the Court that his collateral		
18	estoppel/res judicata claims are persuasive before he can obtain a Proposed Decision to that		
19	effect. By this motion, he is simply asking that the Court allow him have those claims heard at		
20	the threshold, before the case in chief proceeds, to protect the foundational preclusive nature of		
21	the collateral estoppel/res judicata and due process claims he has asserted.		
22	Respectfully submitted,		
23			
24	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		
25	Dated: October 3, 2014 By: John Michael Jensen,		
26	Attorney for Respondent Richard Lewis		
27			
28	6 In 2007, CalPERS neither asserted a right to re-litigate the issues in the future nor obtained an agreement from Mr. Lewis or the City that it would be permitted to do so. - 12 –		
	RICHARD LEWIS' MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/ <i>RES JUDICATA</i> CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING		

DECLARATION OF JOHN MICHAEL JENSEN

I, JOHN MICHAEL JENSEN, declare as follows:

4 1. The statements herein are based upon my personal knowledge and if called to
5 testify under oath in court I could and would so testify.

2. I am over 18 years old.

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7 3. I am the attorney for Respondent Richard Lewis and have been since the
8 commencement of this administrative process.

9 4. Attached as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a Settlement and General
10 Release Agreement executed in March 2007 resolving the dispute between Mr. Lewis and the
11 City of San Bernardino concerning the San Bernardino Fire Department's failure to promote Mr.
12 Lewis to the position of Battalion Chief. I obtained a copy of this document as part of a Public
13 Records Act request I submitted to CalPERS.

5. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a July 5, 2007 letter from
Carlous Johnson, Compensation Review Analyst in CalPERS' Employer Services' Division, to
Laura King of the City of San Bernardino, referencing CalPERS' consideration of the terms of
Exhibit 1 and instructing the City to report Mr. Lewis' three years of back pay at the Battalion
Chief level and his Battalion Chief compensation going forward as "temporary upgrade pay"
special compensation. I obtained a copy of this document as part of the same Public Records Act
request I submitted to CalPERS.

Under penalty of perjury, I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own
knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be
true.

DATED: October 3, 2014

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SETTLEMENT AND GENERAL RELEASE AGREEMENT

This Settlement and General Release Agreement ("Agreement") is entered into by and between the San Bernardino Professional Firefighters Union, Local 891 ("Union") and Richard Lewis (collectively "Plaintiffs") ,on the one hand, and the City of San Bernardino ("City") and Larry Pitzer (collectively "Defendants"), on the other hand, based on the following circumstances.

RECITALS

A. On May 4, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino, Case No. SCV 125902, against Defendants. On June 2, 2005, Case No. SCV 125902 was removed to the United States District Court, Central District of California and assigned Case No. EDCV05-473 VAP (hereafter "Lawsuit").

B. In the Lawsuit, Plaintiffs alleged causes of action arising from or related to the decision to promote Dennis Moon rather than Mr. Lewis to Battalion Chief. Mr. Moon was promoted to Battalion Chief effective October 5, 2004.

C. On May 25, 2006, the Court granted summary judgment to the City, dismissing the City from the Lawsuit. The Court granted partial summary judgment to Chief Pitzer, dismissing all claims against him except the claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

D. Defendants deny, and continue to deny, any and all allegations by Plaintiffs of wrongful act or omission.

E. The parties desire to resolve all pending actions between them, without the further expenditure of time or expense of litigation and, for that reason, enter into this Agreement.

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Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 22 of 37

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AGREEMENTS

In consideration of the promises, covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. <u>SETTLEMENT PAYMENT</u>. The City agrees to pay Plaintiffs the total sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars (\$75,000.00). This payment shall be without withholding for taxes, and represents full settlement of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees, emotional distress and other non-wage damages. Said payment shall be made by check payable to "Goldwasser & Glave, LLP", delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel within twenty days of Plaintiffs' execution of this Agreement, provided that Defendants' counsel has received by then this Agreement and the Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, bearing the signatures of Plaintiffs' counsel, and the Request for Dismissal with Prejudice, bearing the signature of Plaintiffs' counsel.

2. <u>OTHER SUBSTANTIVE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT</u>. As further consideration for this settlement, the parties agree as follows:

a) Mr. Lewis will be paid back pay from the effective date of Mr. Moon's promotion to the present, less required tax withholdings. The back pay shall consist of the difference attacked spreadsheet between Mr. Lewis's actual pay as Captain for all regular hours and what Mr. Lewis would have been paid during such period for such hours had he been a Battalion Chief.
b) Mr. Lewis shall be compensated from the date of this agreement forward as if he had been promoted to the position of Battalion Chief (including all current and/or future the doesn't get benefits granted to Battalion Chiefs) with the exception listed in subsection c, below.
c) Mr. Lewis shall be compensated for all future overtime hours at the Captain rate; to wit, time and one half (1.5) the regular rate of pay Lewis would receive for Fire Captains of

2009 P-5 11845 # 20 10/31/04 P-4 2006 P-5 10367 (94) \$ 117/58.50 x 5= 292.50 2260 mo. 2007 P-5 11040 8512 2528 mo. P-5 11504 P-4 8783

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Mr. Lewis' experience and length of scrvice.

d) For a period of two years from the effective date of this Agreement, the City shall not reassign Mr. Lewis from the station he is currently assigned to without his consent,

3. <u>STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL AND REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL</u>. Plaintiffs counsel shall deliver to counsel for Defendants a Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice signed by counsel, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and a Request for Dismissal with Prejudice, signed by Plaintiffs' counsel, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "B." Counsel for Defendants shall be authorized to file said Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice and Request for Dismissal with Prejudice after the payment specified in paragraph 1 has been made. Each party shall bear its, her or his own attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs further agree not to pursue an appeal of the summary judgment in favor of the City.

4. <u>RELEASE, DISCHARGE AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE</u>, Except for those obligations created by or arising out of this Agreement, Plaintiffs, and each of them, on behalf of themselves and any others claiming by or through them, hereby release and covenant not to sue Defendants and their agents, attorneys, employees, officers, directors, affiliated entities, attorneys, successors and assigns, and representatives, if any, past and present, with respect to any and all causes of action, actions, wages, judgments, liens, indebtedness, damages, losses, claims, liabilities, and demands of whatever kind and character based on acts or omissions occurring on or before the effective date of this Agreement, including but not limited to, claims relating to or arising from the decision not to promote Mr. Lewis to Battalion Chief. Without otherwise limiting the scope of the releases contained in this Agreement, nothing in this paragraph or in paragraph 5 shall limit or affect: (a) the Union's right to pursue claims unrelated

to Mr. Lewis or to the decision not to promote him to Battalion Chief or (b) Mr. Lewis' rights under the California Workers' Compensation Act related to claims and/or injuries unrelated to the decision not to promote him to Battalion Chief.

5. WAIVER OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS. Plaintiffs understand and expressly agree that this Settlement and General Release Agreement extends to all claims of every nature and kind, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, direct or derivative, vested or contingent, past, present or future, arising from or attributable to any allegedly unlawful act or omission or employment practice occurring on or prior to the date of execution of this Agreement, whether set forth in any claim, charge, complaint, or pleadings referred to herein or not, and that any and all rights granted to Plaintiffs under Section 1542 of the California Civil Code or any analogous state or federal law or regulation are hereby expressly waived. Said Section 1542 of the California Civil Code reads as follows:

A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

6. <u>DENIAL OF ANY VIOLATION: AGREEMENT NOT EVIDENCE</u>. This Agreement and the settlement embodied herein do not constitute an admission by Defendants of any of the matters alleged in the Lawsuit or of any violation of federal, state or local law, ordinance or regulation or of any liability or wrongdoing whatsoever. Neither this Agreement nor anything in this Agreement shall be construed to be or shall be admissible in any proceeding as evidence of liability or wrongdoing by Defendants. This Agreement may be introduced, however, in any

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proceeding to enforce the Agreement.

7. <u>WARRANTY OF NON-TRANSFER OF RELEASED MATTER</u>. Plaintiffs warrant and represent that they have not heretofore assigned or transferred to any person not a party to this Agreement any released matter or any part or portion thereof.

8. <u>PAYMENT OF TAXES</u>. Plaintiffs agree that they shall be exclusively responsible for the payment of federal and state taxes, if any, which may be due as the result of the consideration paid under this paragraph 1 of this Agreement. Plaintiffs hereby agree fully to indemnify and hold harmless Defendants from payment of taxes, interest or penalties that may be required by any government agency at any time due to Plaintiffs' failure to pay federal or state taxes on the consideration paid under this Agreement.

9. <u>COMPLETE AGREEMENT</u>. This Agreement constitutes and contains the entire agreement and understanding between the parties concerning settlement of the Lawsuit and the other subject matters addressed herein, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and all agreements, proposed or otherwise, whether written or oral.

10. <u>COUNTERPART EXECUTION: EFFECT: PHOTOCOPIES</u>. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, and each counterpart, when executed, shall have the efficacy of a signed original. Photographic copies or facsimile copies of such signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals for any purpose, absent a genuine issue as to authenticity.

11. JOINT PREPARATION OF AGREEMENT. Each party has cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. Hence, in any construction to be made of this Agreement, the same shall not be construed against any party on the basis that the party was the drafter.

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12. <u>EFFECT OF WAIVER OF BREACH.</u> No waiver of any breach of any term or provision of this Agreement shall be construed to be, or shall be, a waiver of any other breach of this Agreement. No waiver shall be binding unless in writing and signed by the party waiving the breach.

13. <u>FULL UNDERSTANDING AND VOLUNTARY ACCEPTANCE</u>. In entering into this Agreement, the parties represent that they have relied upon the advice of their attorneys, who are attorneys of their own choice, and that the terms of this Agreement have been completely read and explained to them by their attorneys, and that those terms are fully understood and voluntarily accepted by them.

14. <u>COOPERATION IN FULFILLMENT OF AGREEMENT</u>. All parties agree to cooperate fully and to execute any and all supplementary documents and to take all additional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give full force to the basic terms and intent of this Agreement and which are not inconsistent with its terms.

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Dated: <u>3 - 6</u>, 2007

Dated: 3/ ____, 2007

RICHARD LEWIS

SAN BERNARDINO PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 891

By: Name: Position: President



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Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 27 of 37

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	Dated:, 2007	CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO
· ·	·	By: Name: Position:
	Dated:, 2007	LARRY PITZER
•	I, Corey W. Glave, counsel of record	for Plaintiffs, approve as to content and form.
	Dated: 323, 2007	COREY W. GLAVE GOLDWASSER & GLAVE
	:	Corey W) Glave Attorneys for Plaintiffs
	I, James A. Odlum, counsel of record f	for Defendants, approve as to content and form.
	Dated:, 2007	JAMES A. ODLUM MUNDELL, ODLUM & HAWS
		James A. Odlum Attorneys for Defendants
	11.5.2017 1.43 PM	7
		RL MUnion City LP

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SETTLEMENT AND GENERAL RELEASE AGREEMENT

This Settlement and General Release Agreement ("Agreement") is entered into by and between the San Bernardino Professional Firefighters Union, Local 891 ("Union") and Richard Lewis (collectively "Plaintiffs") ,on the one hand, and the City of San Bernardino ("City") and Larry Pitzer (collectively "Defendants"), on the other hand, based on the following circumstances.

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B. In the Lawsuit, Plaintiffs alleged causes of action arising from or related to the decision to promote Dennis Moon rather than Mr. Lewis to Battalion Chief. Mr. Moon was promoted to Battalion Chief effective October 5, 2004.

C. On May 25, 2006, the Court granted summary judgment to the City, dismissing the City from the Lawsuit. The Court granted partial summary judgment to Chief Pitzer, dismissing all claims against him except the claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

D. Defendants deny, and continue to deny, any and all allegations by Plaintiffs of wrongful act or omission.

E. The parties desire to resolve all pending actions between them, without the further expenditure of time or expense of litigation and, for that reason, enter into this Agreement.

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Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 29 of 37

AGREEMENTS

In consideration of the promises, covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth, IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. <u>SETTLEMENT PAYMENT</u>. The City agrees to pay Plaintiffs the total sum of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars (\$75,000.00). This payment shall be without withholding for taxes, and represents full settlement of Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees, emotional distress and other non-wage damages. Said payment shall be made by check payable to "Goldwasser & Glave, LLP", delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel within twenty days of Plaintiffs' execution of this Agreement, provided that Defendants' counsel has received by then this Agreement and the Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice, bearing the signatures of Plaintiffs' counsel, and the Request for Dismissal with Prejudice, bearing the signature of Plaintiffs' counsel.

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Mr. Lewis' experience and length of service.

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to Mr. Lewis or to the decision not to promote him to Battalion Chief or (b) Mr. Lewis' rights under the California Workers' Compensation Act related to claims and/or injuries unrelated to the decision not to promote him to Battalion Chief.

5. <u>WAIVER OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS.</u> Plaintiffs understand and expressly agree that this Settlement and General Release Agreement extends to all claims of every nature and kind, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, direct or derivative, vested or contingent, past, present or future, arising from or attributable to any allegedly unlawful act or omission or employment practice occurring on or prior to the date of execution of this Agreement, whether set forth in any claim, charge, complaint, or pleadings referred to herein or not, and that any and all rights granted to Plaintiffs under Section 1542 of the California Civil Code or any analogous state or federal law or regulation are hereby expressly waived. Said Section 1542 of the California Civil Code reads as follows:

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proceeding to enforce the Agreement.

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13. <u>FULL UNDERSTANDING AND VOLUNTARY ACCEPTANCE</u>. In entering into this Agreement, the parties represent that they have relied upon the advice of their attorneys, who are attorneys of their own choice, and that the terms of this Agreement have been completely read and explained to them by their attorneys, and that those terms are fully understood and voluntarily accepted by them.

14. <u>COOPERATION IN FULFILLMENT OF AGREEMENT</u>. All parties agree to cooperate fully and to execute any and all supplementary documents and to take all additional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give full force to the basic terms and intent of this Agreement and which are not inconsistent with its terms.

Dated: _____, 2007

RICHARD LEWIS

Dated: _____, 2007

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SAN BERNARDINO PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 891

By:		
	Name:	
	Position:	
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Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 34 of 37

Dated: 2007 CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO Position: N ネ Dated: 3-21 2007 LARRY PITZER I, Corey W. Glave, counsel of record for Plaintiffs, approve as to content and form. . 2007 Dated: COREY W. GLAVE **GOLDWASSER & GLAVE** Corey W. Glave Attorneys for Plaintiffs I, James A. Odlum, counsel of record for Defendants, approve as to content and form. Dated: _____, 2007 JAMES A. ODLUM MUNDELL, ODLUM & HAWS James A. Odlum Attomeys for Defendants 7 1.5569 1.42 (51

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Attachment H Richard Lewis' Motion to Hear His Collateral Estoppel/Res Judicata Claims at the Outset of the Hearing Page 36 of 37



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 Employer Services Division

 P.O. Box 942709

 Sacramento, CA, 94229-2709

 Telecommunications Device for the Deaf - (916) 795-3240

 888 CalPERS (or 888-225-7377)

 FAX (916) 795-3005

July 5, 2007

Laura King City of San Bernardino 300 N. D Street San Bernardino, CA 92418

RECEIVED JUL 10 PM 2:

Dear Ms. King:

This letter is in response to your inquiry concerning the Settlement agreement between Mr. Richard Lewis and the City of San Bernardino.

The City has agreed to compensate Mr. Lewis at the Battalion Chief level retroactive back to October 2, 2004. Your specific question is – should this compensation be reported as regular base pay and earnings or as special compensation - temporary up-grade pay.

Since Mr. Lewis will retain his current position title of Fire Captain, the compensation at the Battalion Chief's position should be treated as temporary up-grade pay, and reported as special compensation.

CalPERS request that the City report this compensation on a monthly or semi monthly basis retroactive back to October 2, 2004.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact CalPERS toll free at (888) CalPERS (225-7377).

Sincerely,

Carlous Johnson, Compensation Review Analyst Employer Services Division

California Public Employees' Retirement System www.calpers.ca.gov

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1	<u>PROOF OF SERVICE</u>	
2	I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to	
3	the within action. My business address is Law Offices of John Michael Jensen, 11500 W.	
4		
5	Olympic Blvd., Suite 550, Los Angeles, CA 90064-1524.	
6	On October 3, 2014 I served the following document(s) by the method indicated below:	
7		
8	RICHARD LEWIS' NOTICE AND MOTION TO HEAR HIS COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL/ <i>RES JUDICATA</i> CLAIMS AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING;	
9	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF JOHN MICHAEL JENSEN IN SUPPORT	
10		
11		
12	By placing the document (s) listed above in a sealed envelope (s) and consigning it First Class Mail through the U.S. Postal Service to the address (es) set forth below.	
13		
14	Wesley Kennedy	
15	CalPERS Legal Office P.O. Box 942707	
16	Sacramento, CA 94229-2707	
17		
18 19	Jolena E. Grider Sr. Assistant City Attorney	
20	City of San Bernardino	
20	300N.D Street, 2 nd Floor San Bernardino, CA 92418	
21		
22		
24	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on October 3, 2014, at Los Angeles, California.	
25		
26	Man MM	
20	Griselda Montes De Oca	
28		